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CHANGING PARADIGMS IN THE PUBLIC
POLICY OF STRIKER REPLACEMENTS:
COMBINATION, CONSPIRACY, CONCERT
AND CARTELIZATIONt
MICHAEL H. LEROY*
[A] strike can be conducted up to a certain point with perfect
legality. . . . If that is all we can do, we may be defeated by the
masters making arrangements with other people who may be will-
ing to work for them, either by taking the work home, or by
working for less wages than we think is right, and unless we can
stop that our strike may be ineffective. Then comes the struggle.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a bygone era, the legal relationship of employers and work-
ers was described in terms of master and servant, reflecting the
balance of power between the two groups. While such terminology
is now archaic, workers and employers continue to be bound by
power relationships. In simple terms, employers have the right to
set wages, to determine working conditions and to terminate em-
ployment. Workers have the right to quit their employment. In
certain circumstances, workers who want to pressure their employer
to improve wages or working conditions may engage in a work
stoppage, a temporary cessation of work. If they act in concert, their
work stoppage may be characterized as a strike. A key issue for
striking workers is whether an employer may hire permanent replace-
ments, rather than temporary replacements. Where the law gives
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employers this right, it empowers employers effectively to terminate
the employment relationship.
From organized labor's perspective, nothing has done more to
undermine the balance of power between employers and workers
than the right of employers to hire permanent striker replacements.
The result of this practice is the enervation of the system of collec-
tive bargaining, in which workers and employers negotiate wages
and working conditions. 2
 Increasing numbers of employers provoke
union-represented workers to strike, so that they may hire nonu-
nion replacements or break support for the union by soliciting
workers to abandon their strike and return to work. In short, "[t]he
right to strike has been turned on its head and essentially turned
into an employer weapon."' As a result, unions strike much less
frequently, which gives a misleading sense of labor-management
harmony.
This Article examines the pivotal role that an employer's right
to hire permanent striker replacements plays in adjusting the bal-
ance of power between workers and employers. It traces the evo-
lution of this employer right through three basic legal paradigms:
combination, conspiracy and concert, and examines a proposed
additional paradigm: cartelization. The intended value of this
framework is to provide a broad empirical foundation for reaching
informed judgments about the best means of adjusting the power
relationship between employers and workers with regard to the
pivotal issue of striker replacements.
II. THE ZERO-SUM EQUATION: A WORKER'S RIGHT TO STRIKE AND
AN EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO HIRE PERMANENT STRIKER
REPLACEMENTS
The right to strike is vital to 10.5 million private sector workers
who are represented by unions 4
 and to many of the 6.4 million
2
 For a good discussion of striker replacements and collective bargaining, see Matthew
W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547
(1990).
5 Robert L. Rose, Caterpillar's Success in Ending Strike May Curtail Unions' Use of Walkouts,
WALL ST, J., Apr. 20, 1992, at A3 (quoting Greg Tarpinian).
4 See Gary N. Chaison & Joseph B. Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and
Decline, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 15 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991). Generally, these
employees are covered under the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
187 (1988) ("NLRA"). Certain private sector transportation employees are covered by the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988) ("RLA"). Employees under both statutes
are granted the right to engage in a work stoppage. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988); 45 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1988).
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public sector workers represented by unions. 5
 For American work-
ers, the right to strike emanates from the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA"), which established a national policy for private sector
collective bargaining!' The right to strike reflected Congress's belief
that the nation's economic welfare required distributing wealth and
economic power more evenly among workers and employers.?
Chaison & Rose, supra note 4, at 15. Public sector employees are covered by a patchwork
of collective bargaining acts. The Federal Labor Relations Authority administers federal
collective bargaining regulations. Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988).
However, these employees do not have the right to strike. Id. § 7116(b)(7), Instead, the
Federal Service Impasses Panel is empowered to settle impasses that develop. Id. § 7119.
Postal workers are provided separate collective bargaining rights under the Postal Reorga-
nization Act of 1970 and have interest arbitration in place of the right to strike. 39 U.S.C.
§ 1206 (1988).
For a recent compilation of state statutes that confer sonic form of collective bargaining
rights on public employees (e.g., teachers, police officers, firelighters, municipal employees),
including the express right to strike, see B.V.H. Schneider, Public-Sector Labor Legislation—
All Evolutinary Analysis, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 189,191 n.4 (2d ed., Benjamin Aaron
et al. eds., 1988).
6
 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The NLRA states: "Experience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from
injury, impairment, or interruption. .. ." Id.
Id. The findings and policy section of the NLRA reflects the redistributive aim of the
legislation:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate [form] substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by
preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions
within and between industries.
Id.
During the debate leading to the passage of the Act, congressional sentiment concerning
the inequality of power between employers and workers was sometimes bluer:
[W)hat about national trade associations—they can bargain collectively among
themselves. Nobody steps in and says they cannot organize. Nobody stepped in
when they came down to write the codes of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and said to them that they had no right to organize and bring all their
tradesmen down, their representatives of their organizations, to fix prices and
take care of their own interests, and in these codes exploit workers. No indeed!
Antitrust acts did not apply to them. The antitrust laws were invoked only to
enjoin workers from striking on the grounds that they were interfering with
the free flow of interstate commerce.. ..
Nobody raised a finger against that, but when labor comes in and says that
all we want is the right to go to a booth in a factory and, with no interference
by an employer, with no interference by our foreman, write down on a piece
of paper whether we want a union of our choosing, whether we want a company
union, whether we want no union, that is a different matter. A great cry goes
up that we are oppressing employers.
79 CONG. REC. 9684 (1935) (remarks of Rep. Connery).
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Thus, the NLRA fostered collective bargaining based upon legal
equality of bargaining power. 8 A central tenet of this policy was to
limit government interference in a worker's right to strike.°
Congress regarded the right to strike partly as a right of eco-
nomic liberty for workers,'° but more as an inducement for em-
ployers to mutually adjust differences with labor through collective
negotiations." The United States Supreme Court 12 and the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB")' 3 subsequently recognized the
Senator Wagner, the sponsor of the NLRA, envisioned collective bargaining as an
appropriate process for the adjustment of workplace disputes between employers and em-
ployees. Thus he stated:
While the bill explicitly states the right of employees to organize, their unifica-
tion will prove of little value if it is to be used solely for Saturday night dances
and Sunday afternoon picnics. Therefore, while the bill does not state specifi-
cally the duty of an employer to recognize and bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees, because of the difficulty of setting forth this
matter precisely in statutory language, such a duty is clearly implicit in the
bill.
All collective bargaining is simply a means to an end. That end is not the
mere exchange of pleasantries between employer and employees, but rather
the making of agreements which will stabilize employment conditions and set
fair working standards.
National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the Comm. on Education and Labor,
United States Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
'" See 79 CoNe,. REC. 9730 (1935) (statement of Rep. Connery). Representative Connery,
manager of the Wagner Act bill in the House, stated his opposition to an amendment to
limit the right to strike:
Mr. Chairman, this is another amendment ... that would hamstring this bill.
It would take the heart right out of it and kill the bill. It is another way of
interfering with labor's right to strike, which is not a right that comes from
Congress, but is a divine right which comes from the Almighty God.
Id.
" See To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Comm. on Education
and Labor, United States Senate, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
Senator Wagner stated:
It has been urged that this bill places a premium on discord by declaring that
none of its provisions shall impair the right to strike. On the contrary, nothing
would do more to alienate employee cooperation and to promote unrest than
a law which did not make it clear that employees could refrain from working
if that should become their only redress. But this bill will prevent strikes by the
only feasible and just method; that is, by insuring fair treatment to all parties
and by establishing a powerful and trustworthy agency for the settlement of
disputes.
Id.
See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 234 (1963) (integrity of strike weapon
remaining constant); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Intl Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960)
(exercise of right to strike is part of labor system under the NLRA); UAW v. O'Brien, 339
U.S. 454, 457 (1958) (Congress has recognized and protected the right to strike).
19 See Eads Transfer, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 378, 138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1168, 1170
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centrality of this right to strike. Even when Congress restricted some
strike rights in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 14 the right to conduct
a primary strike (where workers strike their employer) remained
intact.' 5 Senator Robert Taft reflected the integrity of the right to
strike when he stated: "We have done nothing to outlaw strikes for
basic wages, hours, and working conditions after proper opportu-
nity for mediation."' 6
Unlike a worker's right to strike, Congress did not establish an
employer's right to hire permanent striker replacements. Instead,
the Supreme Court established an employer's right to hire perma-
nent replacements in the 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co. 17 In Mackay Radio, the Court held that the telegraph
company discriminated against five union leaders when it refused
to re-hire them after the strike settlement.'fl The Court then deter-
mined that employers had the right to hire permanent striker re-
placements, although that issue was not even before the Court.'"
Thus, one finds the foundation of an employer's right to hire per-
manent striker replacements in the dicta of a case decided over fifty
years ago.
The unions and their members perceive the hiring of perma-
nent striker replacements as an impairment of their inherent right
to strike. 20 In contrast, employers perceive such hirings as a right
vital to remaining globally competitive. 21
 One may formulate the
worker's right to strike and the employer's right to hire permanent
replacement workers as a zero-sum equation: an expansion of one
right results in a reciprocal contraction of the other. It necessarily
(1991); Gaywood Mfg. Co. v. Textile Workers Local 677, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1032, 1036
(1990); Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Steelworkers, 136 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269, 1270 (1990);
Toledo (5) Auto/Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 84, 136 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1157, 1158 (1990).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1988).
is See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
93 CONG. REC. 3835 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1937). For a full discussion of Mackay Radio, see supra notes
202-17 and accompanying text.
IS 304 U.S. at 337.
19 Id. at 345-46.
" Stephen Franklin & David Young, Beyond UAW's Loss, A Setback for Ailing Labor, CHI.
TRIR., Apr. 19, 1992, § C, at 1; David Moberg, Local Strike, National Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 1992, at A37; Robert L. Rose & Gregory A, Patterson, Caterpillar Inc, Threatens to Replace
UAW Strikers, WALL ST. j., Apr. 2, 1992, at A3; For UAW, 'A Question of Survival,' CHI, TRIB.,
Apr. 3, 1992, § C, at I.
21 Tim Ferguson, Tales of the Cal and GM, Joined by a Union, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1992,
at A19; Review and Outlook: The UAW Meets Reality, WALL Sr. J., Apr, 16, 1992, at A24.
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follows, therefore, that an employer's right to hire permanent stri-
ker replacements may be found only in the context of the worker's
right to strike.
III. THE PUBLIC POLICY SIGNIFICANCE OF PERMANENT STRIKER
REPLACEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW
The right to strike retained its vitality following passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act, as hundreds of major strikes occurred after
1947. 22 Starting in 1982, however, the number of major strikes
dropped precipitously and has remained historically low. 23 This
drop occurred shortly after President Ronald Reagan fired and
permanently replaced 11,301 members of the Professional Air
Traffic Controllers Organization ("PATCO") while they were en-
gaged in an unlawful strike. 24 Since then, large or nationally prom-
inent employers have hired or have threatened to hire permanent
replacements for strikers. These employers include Caterpillar; 25
Eastern Airlines; 26 United Airlines; 27 Continental Airlines; 28 Trans
World Airlines;" International Paper;" Greyhound; 3 ' Geo. A. Hor-
mel; 32 Ravenswood Aluminum;" New York Daily News; 34 Chicago
22 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPENSATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS (Mar. 1992).
23 See id.
" See Herbert R. Northrup, The Rise and Demise of PATCO, 37 hvnus. & LAB. REL. REV.
167, 178-79 (1984).
25 See Philip Dine, Job Seekers Besiege Caterpillar; Strikers Resist Urge to Give Up, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 1992, at 10A; Gregory A. Patterson & Robert L. Rose, Labor Makes
a Stand in Fight for Its Future at Caterpillar Inc., WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1992, at Al; Rohert L.
Rose, Thousands Respond to Caterpillar Ads to Replace Striking Workers in Illinois, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 1992, at A3.
26 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, 869 F.2d 1518, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
"See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. United Air Lines, Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1986).
26 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, l II S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1991).
29 See TWA v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 429 (1989).
2° See Adrienne M. Birecree, Capital Restructuring and Labour Relations: The International
Paper Company Strike, I INT'L CONTRIBUTIONS LAB. STUD. 59, 71 (1991).
31 See President of Striking Union Criticizes Greyhound for Seeking Bankruptcy Protection, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at A-14 ( June 6, 1990).
32 See generally HARDY GREEN, ON STRIKE AT HORMEL: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC
LABOR MOVEMENT (1990); DAVE HALE & PAUL KLAUDA, No RETREAT, No SURRENDER: LABOR'S
WAR AT HORMEL (1989).
33 See Special Report: Anatomy of a Corporate Campaign, 46 Union Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18,
at 144 (May 7, 1992).
" See Permanent Replacement Workers Called Key Issue as Daily News Strike Continues, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 210, at A-13 (Oct. 30, 1990).
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Tribune;" Major League Baseball;" and the National Football
Leagues'
The harsh positions taken by these companies suggest that the
PATCO strike encouraged private sector employers to get tough
with striking unions by hiring or threatening to hire permanent
replacements for the striking workers. Because striking is related
to a union's bargaining power, it is important to determine if striker
replacement policy is affecting the ability of union members to
strike, while also implicating other policy concerns.
Hiring permanent striker replacements implicates a web of
public policy issues. At the center of the web, such hiring heightens
labor-management confrontation, sometimes to fever pitch." Al-
though this employment practice is legal, it tends to prolong strikes,
which is inconsistent with the national labor policy favoring peaceful
settlement of workplace disputes." Even without strikes, the actual
or implied threat to hire permanent striker replacements has a
chilling effect on bargaining by upsetting the balance of power
between workers and employers. 46 Moreover, this practice has a
spreading effect. Large employers communicate a "me-too" re-
sponse to smaller employers: first, by reducing labor costs in their
industry, and thereby forcing smaller employers to compete by
"See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Graphic Communications Union, Local 7, 138 L.R.R.M.
(TINA) 1041, 1043 (1991).
3" See Jerome Holtzman, Limps' Strike Is Almost at an End, CHI. SUN-TimEs, May 20, 1979,
at 120.
" See Paul 1). Stauclohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of Free Agency, Ill
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (Aug. 1988).
3" See Robert L. Rose & Alex Kotlowitz, Back to Bickering, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1992, at
Al.
3" 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1988). The NLRA states: "It is the policy of the United States that
sound and stable industrial peace and the advancement of the general welfare . . . of the
Nation . . . can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and
employees through the processes of conference and collective bargaining... ." ld. (emphasis
added).
'" Prohibiting Permanent Replacements: Hearing on H.R. 5 Before the Subcomm of the Comm.
on Public Works and Transp., House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 ( 1991) [hereinafter
Public Works Committee] (statement of Rep. Oberstar). Representative Oberstar stated:
We all lost in strikes, but principles were important. People were willing to lose
income, to experience depravation [sic] and hardship for a principle. Certain
rights, benefits, hours of work, vacation time, and health benefits were important
enough to lay your economic condition on the line. Eventually it would be
negotiated out and both parties would go back to work, but the 'striker] re-
placement concept throws the whole balance of labor-management relations
into a cock pen. Collective bargaining is meaningless if one side can dismiss the
other.
Id.
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reducing their labor costs; and second, by making a profitable ex-
ample of employing striker replacements. Early evidence supports
the spreading-influence thesis. In 1985, 31 percent of employers
stated that they would consider hiring permanent striker replace-
ments.4 ' By 1992, this number rose to 48 percent. 42
Further out in the web, the hiring of permanent striker re-
placements implicates national income policies. The basic rationale
for hiring permanent replacements is to substitute cheaper for more
expensive labor. Employers who exploit labor market competition
by hiring permanent striker replacements effectively bid down
wages and benefits. Competitor firms must match the aggressive
labor cost-cutting of firms hiring permanent replacements, or be-
come uncompetitive in their markets. Meanwhile, workers must be
willing to work for less wages and benefits, or not work at all. There
is also evidence to suggest that reduced strike activity corresponds
to a drop in employee purchasing power.
For the period 1966-1979, an average of 314 strikes occurred
each year. 43 During that same period, inflation increased a total of
141.2 percent,'" while total compensation under collective bargain-
ing agreements increased a total of 154.9 percent. 45 These data
indicate that collective bargaining agreements moderately improved
the purchasing power of organized workers, as total compensation
outpaced inflation.
41
 U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: STRIKES AND THE
USE OF PERMANENT STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN TIIF: 1970s AND 1980s (GA0/14 RD-91-2) (1991),
tbl. 11.1, at 13.
42 Rose, supra note 3, at A3.
4 " BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DENT' OF LABOR, COMPENSATION AND WORKING
CONDITIONS (Mar. 1992), thl. D-1, at 135. The table counts only those work stoppages
involving 1,000 or more workers.
" Historical Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U). - U.S. City Average, All
Items, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEFT' OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT (Jan. 1992),
thl. '14, at 81. This statistic is arrived at by inserting CP1 data into a formula that compounds
annual increases from the beginning of 1966 through the end of 1979. Thus: (76.7 —
31.8) + (31.8 x 100).
" Average Changes in Compensation (Wage and Benefit) Rates Under Collective Bargaining
Settlements Covering 5,000 Workers or More, 1966-91, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DE.P.T
OF LABOR, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS (Mar. 1992), thl. 11-23, at 123. These
data are for all industries and are computed on the annual rate of changes over the life of
the contract for settlements reached in each year. Annual increases compound and therefore
are not additive. For example, in 1966 compensation increased 4.1%. In 1967, a 5.1% increase
compounded the 4.1% increase a year earlier. Thus: 4.1 + (.051 x 4.1) + 5.1 = 9.41. This
means that the compound growth of CBA compensation for 1966-1967 was 9.41%, not the
mere sum of 5.1% + 4.1%. This process was iterated for the period 1966-1979.
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From 1980-1991, however, an average of only 76 strikes oc-
curred per year." Meanwhile, total compensation for workers under
collective bargaining agreements failed to keep pace with inflation.
Total compensation increased a total of 52.8 percent,47 while infla-
tion grew at a rate of 77.2 percent."
The erosion of inflation-adjusted compensation under collec-
tive bargaining agreements can be attributed to several factors,
including: labor organizing laws biased toward employers;" declin-
ing union membership; 5° and an increasing supply of nonunion
labor. 5 ' The decline in strike activity is another factor, particularly
because the decline was accompanied by an increasing number of
employers invoking the permanent replacement strategy. 52 Conse-
quently, the replacement strategy has curtailed union strike activity;
because strikes and the threat of strikes are essential to maintain a
union's bargaining power in contract negotiations, the increased use
of replacement strategy has resulted in a decline of union bargain-
ing power.
At the outer edge of the web, the hiring of permanent striker
replacements threatens the maintenance of law and order. On a
large scale, the East St. Louis race riot of 1917 offers a chilling
" See STATISTICS, supra note 43, at 135.
" See CPI kr,Pou'r, supra note 44, at 81.
4" See Compensation Rates, supra note 45, at 123.
49 See PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 106-07 (1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Right to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,
1775-76 (1983).
" See Michael A. Curme et al., Union Membership and Contract Coverage in the United States,
1983-1988, 44 Brous, & LAB. REL. REv. 5, 7-10 (1990); Peter Linnennan et al., Evaluating
the Evidence on Union Employment and Wages, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34, 35-39 (1990);
Steven G. Allen, Declining Unionization in Construction: The Facts and the Reasons, 41 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 343, 344-45 (1988); William T. Dickens & Jonathan S. Leonard, Accounting
for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323, 325-27
(1985).
The most recent data by the U.S. Census Bureau show the decline of union density.
From 1983 to 1989, unionized employment in mining dropped from 23.1% to 19.7%; in
construction, from 29.4% to 22.6%; in transportation and public utilities, from 46.2% to
34.1%; in wholesale and retail trade, from 9.8% to 7.0%; in finance, from 4.1% to 3.1%;
and in services, from 9.6% to 7.0%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DENT OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991 (111th ed. 1991), tbl, 697, at 524.
51 There is extensive research literature showing that unionized workers are better com-
pensated than similar, unrepresented workers. See Dickens & Leonard, supra note 50, at 328-
30; Linneman et al., supra note 50, at 40-42; see also generally H. GREGG LEWIS, UNION-
RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A SURVEY (1986); Richard Edwards & Paul Swaim, Union-Nonunion
Earnings Differentials and the Decline of Private Sector Unionism, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (1986).
52 See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
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illustration. In 1917, a virtually all-white workforce struck local steel
and metal manufacturers in East St. Louis, Illinois, who responded
by importing 10,000 black laborers from the South to use as striker
replacements.53 As a consequence, one of the bloodiest race riots in
U.S. history occurred. 54 Although the East St. Louis riots are a
distant memory, recent strikes involving permanent replacements
have been marked by extreme tension and occasional violence. 55
5' recent summary of events recalled:
In July 1917, riots sparked partly by the migration of black laborers from the
South claimed the lives of 48 people.. ..
Earlier that year, some 10,000 blacks had poured into East St. Louis from
Southern states after factory owners said they needed workers to fill positions
of' striking white employees in the city's booming metal, chemical and agricul-
tural products industries.
They moved into slums and accepted lower wages than white workers,
heightening racial tensions to the point that Gov. Frank 0. Lowden sent in
troops to maintain order for weeks.
Before LA., East St. Louis Had Race Riot of the Century, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS GAZETTE,
May 5, 1992, at A-B.
A contemporaneous account of the riots offers this chilling account:
Thousands of persons were in the mob. The rioting is a renewal of race troubles
that occurred here a month ago, following the importation of large numbers
of negro laborers from the South. .. . Every hospital on the east side is filled
with blacks who are so severely injured that many will probably die. . .
Race Rioters Fire East St. Louis and Shoot and Hang Many Negroes; Dead Estimated at from 20 to
75, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1917, at 1.
54 As recalled in one news account;
One section of the mob gathered around a lone negro on Fourth Street
near Broadway. A rope was thrown around his neck and he was hoisted up a
telephone pole, but the rope broke. Men and women shouted gleefully as the
negro fell into the gutter, while half a dozen men riddled his body with bullets.
Negroes were lying in the street every few feet in some places.
Race Rioters, supra note 53, at I.
" During the Hormel strike, for example, 800 National Guardsmen were posted to
maintain law and order. Hormel Strikers Close Plant Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1986, at 54. As
soon as they were withdrawn, strikers barricaded all entrances to Hormel's main plant by
double-lining all streets leading to the plant with parked cars. Id. This precipitated "mob
rule" according to the local sheriff. Id. Later, a rally for strikers ended in violence, with eight
police officers hospitalized after being pelted with chunks of asphalt and sprayed with
chemical irritants. Violence Erupts at Rally for Meatpackers Union, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1986,
at 6.
In the Daily News strike eight delivery trucks were destroyed by fire bombs, and 60
trucks and 10 buses were damaged within the first five days of the strike. See Permanent
Replacement Workers Called Key Issue, supra note 34, at A-14.
Capturing the tension of imminent violence in the UAW-Caterpillar strike, a reporter
who witnessed picketing in Peoria noted:
Strikers and security guards—dubbed 'rent-a-thugs' by workers—glare at each
other across the gates as soldiers once did in divided Germany... .
In almost pleading terms, Peoria's newspaper, the Journal Star, told readers
in an editorial, "Peoria is already losing, and losing big.. .. And so a fearful
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Given the simmering grievances between various racial and ethnic
groups in the United States, it is conceivable that a strike involving
the hiring of permanent replacements could spark serious disor-
der. 56 In short, where labor market competition is the governing
rationale for hiring permanent replacements, volatile race and class
issues may mix with more narrow issues of labor-management re-
lations and collective bargaining. Even in more typical situations
not charged by class or race issues, the hiring of striker replacements
rends the social fabric of affected communities."
During the 1980s, the number of strikes in the United States
dropped to a historical low. An increasing number of large com-
panies either hired or threatened to hire permanent replacements
for striking workers. This emerging striker replacement policy not
only threatens the right to strike, but also has serious repercussions
and frustrated community waits and watches fur the play to go on. 	 Mean-
while we ask again . . . for peace. Violence may vent frustration but will
accomplish nothing."
Philip Dine, On Labor Bitter Feelings on Labor War Engulf Peoria, Sr. Louts Pos.r-DisPATcu,
Apr. 10, 1992, at 12D.
56 The intermixing of race and employment issues is illustrated by the aftermath of the
1992 Los Angeles riots. One reporter noted that
[b]lacks have stopped Latino firms from cleaning up the mess if they do not
employ enough blacks; one black activist told the Los Angeles Times that "Mexi-
cans and Koreans do not deserve to work if we don't work." Latinos in the city
nurse a long grievance that public employment policy ... is skewed toward
blacks.
Return of the Nativist, Et:or:must June 27, 1992, at 25.
57 See Dine, supra note 55, at 12D. Dine observed:
[T]his normally tranquil community is in danger of being ripped apart.
That is evident, first of all, on the picket line, which pits neighbor against
neighbor. Striking workers jeer employees who drive into the parking lot,
reserving their most vociferous comments for fellow union members crossing
the line.
As the 'turncoats' are identified, workers such as Tom Shults, a 28-year Cater-
pillar veteran, announce the names through a bullhorn. The tactic, meant to
embarrass and intimidate, has proved powerful.
Id. See also Dine, supra note 25, at 10A. Striker Ed Heifer stated: "The feeling is it's a mean-
spirited company that would force people to make a choice between your friends, your family
and a job." Striker Irene Thompson crossed a long, angry picket line on April 6. A news
account captured the moment:
After arriving in a near-empty parking lot, the mother of two sat in her car a
few minutes—then turned around and drove out. "1 planned on going to
work. . . . But after I crossed the line, I felt horrible. . ." She concluded:
"When someone tells you not to cross a picket line for 20 years, whets you do
it it does something to you."
Id.
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upon the balance of power between labor and management, na-
tional income policies, and law and order.
IV. COMBINATION, CONSPIRACY, CONCERT AND CARTELIZATION:
THE FOUR PARADIGMS OF STRIKER REPLACEMENT LAW
In seeking to fit roughly two hundred years of legal experience
into a handful of paradigms, this Article aims for a wider historical
perspective than previous efforts to generalize the central tenden-
cies of striker replacement doctrines. 58 Because paradigms are mod-
els, they organize vast phenomena and data into concise descriptions
on which others may articulate or specify further." The use of
paradigms also permits this Article to demonstrate the influence of
English law in the formation and evolution of striker replacement
policies in the United States."
This discussion begins by observing that from the late 1700s
until 1938, there was no American striker replacement policy per
se. Various statutes and court decisions, however, implicitly created
" For examples of previous striker replacement works, see Finkin, supra note 2, at 549-
56; Joan Flynn, The Economic Strike Bar: Looking Beyond the "Union Sentiments" of Permanent
Replacements, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 691 (1988); Douglas E. Ray, The Changing Face of Labor-Manage-
ment Confrontations in the Late '80's, 30 B.C. L. REV. 101 (1988); Paul Weiler, Striking a New
Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351
(1984).
" See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). "In a
science," Kuhn noted, ". . a paradigm is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an
accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and
specification under new or more stringent conditions." Id. at 23. Kuhn compared the concept
of paradigm to the practice of "normal science," which means "research firmly based upon
one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific com-
munity acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice." Id. at
10. Scientists, like judges and lawmakers, rarely if ever discover or articulate new paradigms;
rather, they engage in the "mop-up work" that "a paradigm leaves to be done." Id. at 24.
Thus, normal science is an enterprise "to force nature into the preformed and relatively
inflexible box that the paradigm supplies. No part of the aim of normal science is to call
forth new sets of phenomena; indeed, those that will not fit the box are often not seen at
all." Id.
6" This Article maintains that English legal influence was especially pronounced in the
nineteenth century. See infra notes 142-62 and accompanying text. Most recently, the influ-
ence of English law has been virtually nil because American labor policy does not consciously
borrow from Britain as it once did. It is noteworthy, however, that declining union bargaining
power and diminished strike activity were closely congruent in Britain and the U.S. through-
out the 1980s. Strike frequency in Britain plummeted much as it did in the U.S., except that
the decline began in 1980 rather than 1982. In Britain there were 2,080 strikes in 1979, but
only 1,330 strikes in 1980; 1,338 strikes in 1981; 1,528 strikes in 1982; 1,352 strikes in 1983;
and 1,206 strikes in 1984. Roy Lewis, The Role of the Law in Employment Relations, in LABOR
LAW IN BRITAIN 26 (Roy Lewis ed., 1986). These data are germane because they suggest that
the issue of permanent striker replacements is not a uniquely American phenomenon.
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such policy. There are two issues at the threshold of any striker
replacement policy: whether worker organization (also called "com-
bination") is lawful, and whether concerted activity by workers (and
striking, in particular) is lawful.
Although striker replacement issues did not arise during the
earliest period of American history, American law grappled with
the first paradigm of combination. The combination paradigm de-
veloped in English law, but American courts were hesitant to accept
4.6 ' Nevertheless, the English combination paradigm influenced the
formation of American labor policy. This first Anglo-American
paradigm held that worker efforts to combine or organize for their
mutual economic interests were unlawful. Early court decisions
viewed worker combination as a restraint on trade; they regarded
the public interest in setting wage rates through free labor market
competition as supervening any interest workers had in determining
their wages or piece rates.
The combination paradigm was eventually repudiated. For in-
stance, in the 1842 case of Commonwealth v. Hunt, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court recognized the legality of worker combination by
citing as authority the parliamentary laws of 1824 and 1825 that
delineated the boundaries of permissible and impermissible striker
conduct. 62 The law took yet another turn, however, as federal and
state decisions sharply limited the concerted activity of worker com-
binations, thereby rendering such combinations ineffective.
These latter decisions formed the second paradigm of conspir-
acy, which took a stringent view of striker rights and an expansive
view of the right of employers to hire permanent replacements. It
is difficult to say whether the new paradigm was the product of a
new generation of judges or more aggressive union strategies for
engaging in concerted activities.
It is essential to note that American unions during this period
mimicked the conduct of English unions, particularly in their efforts
to prevent striker replacements from working. They organized con-
sumer boycotts of struck employers who hired replacement workers
and they "blacklisted" scabs, or striker replacements. A striking
union, for example, would attempt to prevent boardinghouses from
putting up striker replacements through its blacklist. The law thus
began to distinguish between lawful objectives of worker combination
and lawful means for effectuating those objectives. Striker rights
61 See Edwin E. Wine, Early American Labor Cases, 35 VALE L.J. 825, 826 (1925).
62 45 Mass. (4 Met.) I I 1 (1842).
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were consequently infused with common law doctrines of criminal
conspiracy.
The third paradigm, concert, is rooted in the 1935 NLRA.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act and a series of Supreme Court de-
cisions between 1938 and 1988 sharply curtailed the right to strike,
this Article maintains that the concert paradigm is still intact. This
paradigm is marked by the legislative repeal of common law prin-
ciples undergirding the conspiracy paradigm. Contrary to the con-
spiracy paradigm, the concert paradigm legitimizes as a matter of
public policy a union's use of an economic strike in furtherance of
collective negotiations with an employer over wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment. Oddly, however, this era also
includes the Mackay Radio decision, which expressly states that an
employer has the right to hire permanent replacements. This para-
digm, therefore, creates a tension between workers and employers
in the event of a strike.
The fourth paradigm, cartelization, is only in proposal form. 63
It is defined by the paradigm-breaking premise that an employer
may hire only temporary striker replacements. This public policy
would effectively limit the pool of replacement workers available to
struck employers.
In the present debate over this proposal, organized labor takes
the view that this measure would simply restore the status quo
before the wrongly decided Mackay Radio decision and President
Reagan's popularization of the permanent striker replacement strat-
egy through the PATCO strike. 64 From a historical perspective,
labor's view in this matter is unfounded. This Article suggests,
6  See infra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
Preventing Replacement of Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Comm, on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990)
[hereinafter Labor Hearing] (statements of Sen. Metzenbaum and Thomas Donahue). A
portion of the exchange between Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Thomas Donahue,
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO, follows:
Senator Metzenbaum: How do you account for the fact that the Mackay decision,
made about 50 years ago, that for about 40 years there were no problems, and
employers went along and did not bring in permanent replacements.. Then,
starting about 10 years ago, we found this new movement to bring in permanent
replacements... .
Mr. Donahue: I think there has been a sea change. Senator, in the whole climate
of industrial relations in this country. I think the employers have been embol-
dened by President Reagan's action in the PATCO strike—there simply is no
question in my mind about that.
Id.
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nevertheless, that there is a sound public policy reason for breaking
the concert paradigm in favor of cartelization: 65
 the restoration of
balance in bargaining power between workers and employers.
A. The Paradigm of Combination
In colonial America, many workers formed organizations to
promote their economic interests.° 'Typically, these organizations
were small cells formed on the basis of craft occupations.° Although
collective bargaining between workers and employers did not exist,
workers acted together to improve their wages. 6  The short supply
of skilled labor in a growing land and economy favored workers
who formed such combinations.° Although the colonies were sub-
ject to English laws, they formulated their own employment law
through their legislatures and municipalities. 7° Courts consequently
had available to them colonial statutes regulating wage rates and
restraints on combination. 71
Many of the earlier combination cases have sometimes been
grouped under the category of conspiracy. It is not difficult to see
65 See discussion in Section 1V-D.
66 Excellent overviews of early American labor cases and strike activity involving these
organizations appear in Witte, supra note 61, and Waiter Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 32
Comm. L. REV. 1128, app. at 1166-69 (1932).
67 See David J. Saposs, Colonial and Federal Beginnings (to 1827), in 1 HISTORY OF LABOUR
IN THE UNITED STATES 25, 108-18 ( John R. Commons ed., 1918) (discussing the formation
of groups of shoemakers and cordwaincrs, typographers, tailors, sailors and textile workers).
68 See id. at 121. Saposs summarized the interchange between workers and employers:
The early trade unions started out with individual bargaining. The present
practice of asking for a conference with representatives of employers in order
to agree upon terms collectively was not thought of until later, Not even con-
ferences were held between the individual employers and the representatives
of the men. They merely determined a scale of prices and pledged one another,
as in the case of the shoemakers, 'not to work for any employer who did not
give the wages, nor beside any journeyman who did not get the wages.' The
journeymen very likely copied this method from their masters, who as mer-
chants were accustomed to determine prices and pledge each other to abide by
them.
Id.
66 Richard Morris observed that
the scarcity and high cost of labor ... assured the workman of a higher standard
of living than was obtainable by a person of similar employment in England or
on the Continent. . . . The colonial workman commanded real wages which
exceeded by from 30 to 100 per cent the wages of a contemporary English
workman.
RICHARD B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 44-45 (1981).
" See, e.g., id. at 17-18 (laws enacted to protect workers against unfair dismissal).
71 See id. at 18-21.
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how the classification of cases involving worker organizations may
be unclear. For the purpose of this discussion, the author groups
the following cases as falling under the combination paradigm.
The early American Cordwainers decision involved a strike and
the legality of worker organization. 72 Although the facts and precise
legal issues in the Cordwainers case are not recorded, there is this
report of the judge's instructions to the jury: "A combination of
workmen to raise their wages may be considered in a twofold point
of view: one is to benefit themselves . . . the other to injure those
who do not join their society. The rule of law condemns both." 73
The jury found the journeymen "guilty of a combination to raise
wages."74
In People v. Fisher, journeymen shoe and bootmakers in Geneva,
New York, agreed to make their products for not less than one
dollar a pair.75 Thomas Pennock, a journeyman shoemaker, con-
tracted with Daniel Lum, a master shoemaker, to make ten pairs of
boots for 75 cents a pair. 76 As a result, no boot or shoemaker who
agreed to the one dollar minimum rate would work for Lum until
he fired Pennock.77 Lum eventually bent to this pressure and fired
Pennock. 78
In ruling that Fisher and his fellow trade unionists were
properly charged with an indictable offense, 79 the court reasoned
72 Saposs, supra note 67, at 140.
73 Id. at 140-41. Compare Commonwealth v. Carlise (Pa. 1821) Bright 36, cited in Witte,
supra note 61, at 826, n.10 (involving employers who were charged with combining to depress
wage rates for workers). The judge in that case stated that the law would view such a
combination as illegal if employers sought to reduce wages "below what they would be, if
there was no recurrence to artificial means by either side." Id.
" Saposs, supra note 67, at 141.
75 14 Wend. 9, 10 (1837). The journeymen were charged with "form[ing] and uniting]
themselves into an unlawful club and combination. . . ." Id. They were also charged with
"conspir[ing] . . . with other persons ... to prevent any journeyman boot and shoemaker, in
the Village of Geneva, from working his trade and occupation below certain rates and
prices.. , ." Id, The journeymen's association promulgated a rule requiring that any member
who worked below the proscribed rate would pay a $10 penalty to the association. Id. Compare
Pattern Makers League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985), discussed infra notes 241-46 and
accompanying text, where the union fined members crossing its picket line to work during
a strike.
76 Fisher, 14 Wend. at 10-1 I.
" Id. at 1 1 .
76 Id.
79 Fisher was charged under New York's conspiracy laws, which provided: "If two or
more persons shall conspire to either ... commit any act injurious to . trade or commerce
... they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 14-15.
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that the worker combination was itself unlawful and that the com-
bination had employed unlawful means." It concluded that the
journeymen's association was "a monopoly of the most odious
kind."'" The court observed that if the journeymen were permitted
to set their own wages, they would be regulating the prices of all
manufactured goods, and thus the community would "be enor-
mously taxed."82 Applying a New York statute to the facts, the court
concluded, "Such combinations would be productive of derange-
ment and confusion, which certainly must be considered 'injurious
to trade.'"83 The combination was harmful first because, "[i]n the
present case, an industrious man was driven out of employment by
unlawful measures" 84 and second, because "an injury [was] done to
the community, by diminishing the quantity of labor and of internal
trade."85
The Fisher court reflected a strain of American judicial thought
favoring unrestrained competition in labor markets." Soon after
Fisher, another court in an unreported decision found a combination
of twenty tailors unlawful, sparking a mass protest." Shortly there-
after, the combination paradigm retreated . 88
At least one other factor contributed to the demise of the
combination paradigm. In 1824, the English Parliament repealed
its price-setting regulations for a wide range of crafts and occupa-
tions." This revisionist legislation hastened the end of the combi-
'° Id. at 18.
8 ' Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19.
82 Id.
88 Id.
84 Id. at 18.
85 Id. at 19.
88
 See Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19. The Fisher court remarked:
It is true, that no great danger is to be apprehended on account of the imprac-
ticability of such universal combinations. But if universally or even generally
entered into, they would be prejudicial to trade and to the public; they are
wrong in each particular case. The truth is, that industry requires no such
means to support it. Competition is the life of trade.
Id.
87 See Witte, supra note 61, at 827. After the verdict was announced, 27,000 workers
rallied in the streets of New York City and burned the judge in effigy. Id.
a" Id. Witte concluded that the unlawful combination theory undergirding cases such as
Fisher, Cordwainers, and 7'wenly Tailors "was allowed to die by common consent. No leading
case was required For its overthrow. America was poor soil for this transplanted doctrine,
and it could not withstand the hearty blasts of Jacksonian democracy." Id.
89 Act to Repeal the Laws Relative to the Combination of Workmen, 5 Geo. 4, ch. 95,
§ I (1824) (Eng.).
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nation paradigm. Before the Act of 1824, English law prevented
workers from "conspiring" to standardize prices for their services. 90
In repealing wage-regulating laws, the Act provided that
Journeymen, Workmen, or other Persons who shall enter
into any Combination to obtain an Advance, or to fix the
Rate of Wages, or to lessen or alter the Hours or Duration
of the Time of working, or to decrease the quantity of
Work . . . shall not therefore be subject or liable to any
Indictment or Prosecution for Conspiracy, or to any other
Criminal Information or Punishment whatever, under the
Common or Statute Law. 9 '
This law was paradigm-breaking for two reasons. First, it le-
galized worker organization for the purpose of affecting wage rates
and working conditions. Second, the law permitted workers "to
induce another to depart from his Service before the End of the
Time or Term for which he is hired, or to quit or return his Work
before the same shall be finished, or . . . to refuse to enter into
Work or Employment . . ." when it stated that such conduct "shall
not therefore be subject or liable to any Indictment or Prosecution
for Conspiracy, or to any other Criminal Information or Punish-
ment whatever, under the Common or Statute Law." 92
 The first two
clauses permitted combinations to engage in concerted work stop-
pages (strikes), while the last clause legitimated striker efforts to
prevent replacements from working.
The Act did not permit strikers absolute freedom to prevent
striker replacements from taking their jobs. It outlawed striker
conduct aimed at persuading replacements to stop working where
"any Person by Violence to the Person or Property, by Threats or
Intimidation, shall wilfully or maliciously force another" to stop
working. 93 Thus, the law struck a balance between a striker's right
to protect his work stoppage against labor market competition and
an employer's right to continue operations during a strike. This
90 5 Geo. 4, ch. 95, § 3 (1824). These laws included "Of the Fees of Craftsmen and The
Price of Their Worke"; "Of Writches and Mason"; "The Price of Craftsmenne Work, of Meat
and Drinke in Taverns"; "An Act for Regulating the Trade of Silk Throwing"; "An Act for
Regulating the Journeymen Tailors Within the Weekly Bills of Mortality"; "An Act to Prevent
Unlawful Combinations of Workmen Employed in the Woolen Manufactures, and for the
Payment of Wages," and scores of others.
91 5 Geo. 4, ch. 95, § 2.
92 Id.
93 5 Geo. 4, ch. 95, § 5.
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balance permitted employers to utilize replacements but also per-
mitted strikers to appeal to replacements not to work.
The paradigm break engendered by the Act was so apparent
that Parliament repealed it a year later in the Act of 1825." The
repeal reflected Parliament's concern that legalization of worker
combinations was "injurious to Trade and Commerce, [and] dan-
gerous to the Tranquillity of the Country."95 Although it continued
to treat worker combinations as legal,`-'° the Act broadened restric-
tions on striker conduct directed at replacements. It did so by
prohibiting workers from forcing or attempting to force other work-
ers to quit their labor by "Violence to the Person or Property, or by
Threats or Intimidation, or by molesting or in any way obstructing
another" from working.° 7
The paradigm break in English law was joined in American law
only with the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Common-
wealth v. Hunt. 98 Although combination was not fully accepted by
American courts, some cases do make mention of it. Hunt, however,
marked the end of the combination paradigm by rejecting the legal
premise that worker combinations were per se illegal. 99
In Hunt, seven bootmakers were indicted for forming an illegal
workers' combination that conspired to compel Isaac Wait, an em-
ployer, to discharge Jeremiah Horne, a nonunion boottnaker.m In
reversing a guilty judgment of the municipal court,'°' the Hunt
court carefully delineated the boundary between conspiracy, lawful
combination and concerted activity. It noted that if the defendants
had used physical force or fraud to compel Wait to fire Horn, "it
would have been a different case." 1 °2 But here the bootmakers had
stopped short of coercion or compulsion, for "[i]t was the agreement
" See Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to The Combination of Workmen, 6 Geo. 4, ch.
129,	 I (1825) (Eng.).
95 Id.
90 See 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129, § 4. Section 4 provided:
That this act shall not extend to subject any Persons to Punishment, who shall
meet together for the sole Purpose of consulting upon and determining the
Rate of Wages or Prices . . . or the Hours or the Time for which he or they
shall work . . . or who shall enter into any Agreement, verbal or written, among
themselves, for the Purpose of fixing the Rate of Wages.
97 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129, 3.
98 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 1 I 1 (1842).
99 See id. at 129.
' 00 Id. at 112-14.
1 ° 1 Id. at 136.
1 °2 1d. at 132.
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not to work for him, by which they compelled Wait to decline
employing Horne longer."'"
In breaking the combination paradigm, the court reasoned that
a trade combination would not be unlawful because workers could
use this power for honorable purposes such as to help other workers
in times of poverty or sickness, "or to raise their intellectual, moral
and social condition; or to make improvement in their art. . . '1104
In this case, the indictments failed because the bootmakers' agree-
ment not to work for an employer who hired anyone who was not
a member of a particular association'm did not constitute an unlaw-
ful purpose, and the indictments "set forth no ... illegal or criminal
means to be adopted for the accomplishment of any purpose.' ,106
A key passage reveals that the Hunt court was significantly
influenced by Parliament's Act of 1824 in analyzing the bootmakers'
combination:
It does not aver a conspiracy or even an intention to raise
wages; and it appears by the bill of exceptions, that the
case was not put on the footing of a conspiracy to raise
their wages. Such an agreement, as set forth in this count, would
be perfectly justifiable under the recent English statute, by which
this subject is regulated. St. 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129. 1 °7
The combination paradigm developed primarily in English law but
also had some influence in the development of American law. Amer-
ican courts, which favored unrestrained competition in labor mar-
kets, were likely to find combinations unlawful. The paradigm break
eventually came with the Hunt court, which rejected the notion that
worker combinations were per se illegal.
B. The Paradigm of Conspiracy
The Cordwainers and Fisher courts found worker combination
unlawful primarily as a restraint of trade. In the paradigm that
followed, courts continued to be strongly and favorably influenced
by free market arguments. But the respected Hunt court created a
problem for later courts, because it recognized that worker orga-
1 " Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 133.
104 Id. at 129. However, "Eilf a large number of men, engaged for a certain time, should
combine together to violate their contract, and quit their employment together, it would
present a very different question," according to the court. Id. at 131.
105 Id .
106 Id.
107 Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
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nizations were founded for a variety of purposes, including frater-
nity, philanthropy and education.'" Outlawing worker combina-
tions per se would raise problems in states where associational rights
were protected. Accordingly, judicial restriction of worker organi-
zations and their activities required a fundamentally different the-
oretical basis. The result was the conspiracy paradigm, in which
common law principles of criminal conspiracy were applied to trade
union activities, especially strikes.
In contrast to the combination paradigm, which viewed mere
association of workers to advance collective interests as illegal, the
conspiracy paradigm focused instead on the coordinated activities
of those workers. Frequently, in decisions where courts found crim-
inal or civil liability, courts evaluated the ends and means of coor-
dinated worker activity by reference to general philosophical prin-
ciples such as free market competition, economic liberty, freedom
of association and freedom of contract. If the activities infringed
upon any of these sacred principles, the means were considered to
be an unlawful conspiracy.
It is essential to note that several English common law decisions
strongly influenced the American courts that recognized the con-
spiracy paradigm.'° 9
 These American courts also distilled principles
of unlawful intimidation and molestation from parliamentary stat-
utes and applied these principles to cases involving striker efforts
to prevent replacements from working. The English decisions on
which American courts based the conspiracy paradigm included
Regina v. Selsby,"° Regina v. Rowlands," Regina v. Duffield," 2
 and
Regina v. Bauld." 3
'°8 See 45 Mass. (4 Met.) at 129. ironically, early trade unions grew out of fraternal labor
organizations founded by workers and employers:
Prior to and immediately after the Revolution workers and employers had
cooperated on anumber of issues, and had even formed mutual benefit societies
'for the laudable purpose of protecting such as their brethren as by sickness or
accident may stand in need of assistance, and for the relief of widows, and
orphans of those who die (reference omitted):
I PHILIPS. HONER, HISTORY OR THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1947).
'°' See infra notes 141-58 and accompanying text for a full discussion of these American
decisions. The decisions also imported principles derived from parliamentary statutes and
were especially influential from the 1860s to the 1880s because of the absence of federal
labor and antitrust statutes.
"° 5 Cox Cr. Cas. 495 (1851). Reg. v. Selgry was unreported after its decision in 1847 by
Mr. Baron Rolfe at South Lancashire Spring Assizes. Id. at 495.
lit 169 Eng. Rep. 540 (Q.B. 1851).
" 2 5 Cox Cr. Cas. 404 (1851), aff 'd sub 710M. Reg. v. Rowlands, 169 Eng. Rep. 540 (Q.B.
1851).
" 2 13 Cox Cr. Cas. 282 (1986).
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Selst., is unique among these decisions for dismissing allegations
that strikers were engaged in a conspiracy. A group of workers was
indicted for attempting to induce other workers to quit their em-
ployment at a foundry by picketing outside the building and passing
out pamphlets." 4 The workers took this action based on a pact to
set wages with an employer and to establish a mutual benefit strike
fund.' 15 The court ruled in favor of the strikers, reasoning that if
it was not unlawful for workers to make agreements to withhold
work under certain circumstances, then it was also not unlawful for
these workers to peaceably persuade others to do the same."° The
crux of the court's reasoning was that the strikers had engaged in
informational rather than coercive conduct; as such, their peaceable
conduct was not illegal."'
Rowlands differed from Selsby because it upheld criminal con-
spiracy counts against strikers who attempted to prevent replace-
ments from working. It is critical to note that the Act of 1825, which
narrowed the scope of permissible striker conduct,'" was pivotal in
deciding these cases." 9 This point is essential because American
courts working with the conspiracy theory cited Rowlands as au-
thority and thereby incorporated elements of the 1825 statute and
English courts' construction of that law.
In Rowlands, a group of workers faced twenty criminal counts
of "conspiracy by molesting workmen to compel them to quit their
employment" during a labor dispute at a manufacturer of tin
pans."° In particular, Green, a union delegate, "had stated that the
society [union] had £20,000 at their command, and that, if the
[employers] discharged a man, because he was a member of their
association, they could stop the supplies, and they would not have
a single hand upon their works." 12 ' Trade unionist Peel carried a
sign with inflammatory language decrying the harsh treatment by
the employer and defending the workers' conduct as appropriate.' 22
14 See Selsby, 5 Cox. Cr. Cas. at 495-96.
" 5 See id. at 496-97.
116 1d. at 498.
" 7 Id.
"" For a discussion of this Act, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
119 See Reg. v. Rowlands, 169 Eng. Rep. 540,549 (Q.B. 1851); Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox.
Cr. Cas. 404,428 (1851), aff'd sub ream. Reg. v. Rowlands. 169 Eng. Rep. 540 (Q.B. 1851).
' 2°169 Eng. Rep. at 541.
151 Id. at 551.
12-2 Id.
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A jury found the defendants guilty on all the conspiracy counts,
and an appeal followed.' 23 Counsel for Rowlands argued that the
conspiracy indictment was defective because the Act of 1825 defined
unlawful striker conduct too ambiguously.' 24 Although the appeals
court entered a nolle prosequi for Rowlands and Winters, it sustained
the convictions of Peel, Green, Duffield, Woodnorth and Gaunt and
sentenced them to three months in prison.'25
The court's reasoning in sustaining Peel's and Green's convic-
tion reflected the ambiguous framing of the 1825 Act. The court
found that the statute permitted workers to act in concert for their
mutual aid and benefit when it observed that "[t]he object of the
Legislature was, that all masters and workmen should be left free
in the conduct of their business. The masters were at liberty to give
what rate of wages they liked, and to agree among themselves for
what wages they would pay." 12t" As for workers, they were "at liberty
to agree among themselves for what wages they would work, and
were not restricted in so doing by the circumstance that they were
in the employ of one or other of the masters." 127 But the court was
attracted to the conspiracy fragments in the statute, notwithstanding
their vague delineation, when it focused on the provision pertaining
to means to attain the lawful ends of worker combination:
The intention of the Legislature was to make them quite
free, but, seeing that intimidation might be used to carry
out such agreement, it was enacted . . . that if any person
should by violence, threats, intimidation, molesting or ob-
structing another, force, or endeavor to force, any work-
men to depart from his employ, or prevent him from
accepting employment . . . he should be liable to
imprisonment. . . . 128
Thus, the court viewed Green's threat to prevent replacements from
working if a unionist were discharged on account of membership
in the society as a threat "within the Act of Parliament." 129
125 /d. at 543.
124 Id. at 544. Counsel argued that "the counts proceed upon the words of the Act of
Parliament—molesting, obstructing, by threats or intimidation; but it is submitted that they
are all bad, as being too general." Id.
L25 169 Eng. Rep. at 551.
126 Id. at 551 n.(a).
t27
129 Id.
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In the period following Rowlands, a public policy tug-of-war
appeared to take place over the issue of a worker's right to prevent
replacements from working for a struck employer. An 1859 Act of
Parliament increased strikers' protection against replacements. 13°
Those protections were later reinforced by the Trade Union Act of
1871.' 3 ' In the same year, however, Parliament passed a conspiracy
law that failed to immunize certain striker conduct from criminal
prosecution.'" The Criminal Conspiracy and Protection of Property
Act of 1875 broadened this law considerably.'" The 1875 law ap-
plied particularly to striker replacement scenarios. It protected re-
placements and employers wishing to hire replacements by crimin-
alizing conduct undertaken "with a view to compel any other person
to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has
a legal right to do or abstain from doing. . . "134
13" See An Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to Workmen, 22 & 23 Vict., ch. 34, 1 (1859)
(Eng.). The Act broadened permissible striker conduct by providing:
No Workman or other Person, whether actually in employment or not, shall,
by reason merely of his entering into an Agreement with any Workman or
Workmen . for the Purpose of fixing or endeavoring to fix the Rate of Wages
or Remuneration at which they or any of them shall work, or by reason merely of
his endeavoring peaceably, and in a reasonable manner; and without Threat or Intimi-
dation, direct or indirect, to persuade others to cease or abstain from Work . . . shall be
deemed or taken to be guilty of 'Molestation' or 'Obstruction' within the Mean-
ing of the said Act. .. .
Id. (emphasis added). This language is significant because Parliament expressly limited the
vague prohibition against molestation and obstruction in the Act of 1825. It did so by
permitting peaceful and reasonable efforts by strikers to persuade, educate and inform
replacements about the effect of their strike-breaking conduct. See id.
13 ' 34 & 35 Vict., ch. 31, § 1 (1871) (Eng.). Section 3 of the Act provided that "[t)he
purposes of any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade,
be unlawful so as to render void or voidable any agreement or trust." Id. § 3. It is critical to
note that § 4 of the Act deprived all courts of jurisdiction to "entertain any legal proceeding
instituted with the object of directly enforcing or recovering damages for the breach of any"
of certain kinds of agreements. Id. § 4. This section covered "any agreement between
members of a trade union as such, concerning the conditions on which any members .. .
shall or shall not sell their goods, transact business, employ or be employed," and conse-
quently, legitimated work stoppages that might otherwise be attacked as restraints of trade.
Id. Moreover, the Act provided for "the application of the funds of a trade union to provide
benefits to members," thereby sanctioning a trade union's payment of strike benefits. Id.
Another provision permitted lainy agreement made between one trade union and another,"
thereby sanctioning unions to coordinate strike activity. Id.
'" An Act to Amend the Criminal Law Relating to Violence, Threats, and Molestation,
34 & 35 Vict., ch. 32, § 1 (1871) (Eng.),
'" 38 & 39 Vict., ch, 86, 3 (1875) (Eng.). This law defined and criminalized acts of
intimidation and annoyance that frequently occasioned strikes. See id.
134 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 86, § 7. The law imposed criminal liability on anyone who:
1. Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children, or
injures property; or,
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Soon after the 1875 law was enacted, Baron Huddleston de-
cided the case of Regina v. Bauld against James Bauld and eight
fellow unionists who sought hourly wages instead of piece-rates. 135
The workers were charged under the law with watching and beset-
ting two employers, Easton and Anderson, to discourage replace-
ments from crossing their picket line.'" In Bauld, counsel for the
unionists argued: "As to the charge of 'watching' and 'besetting'
your Lordship is aware that there are two views which may be taken.
If it were done merely for the purpose of persuading the men to
quit their employment it would not be illegal."'" Baron Huddleston
rejected this argument, observing that the law permitted only
"watching or attending near a place for the purpose of obtaining
or communicating information. . ."' 38 Taking a restrictive view of
striker conduct toward replacements, Huddleston explained that
this provision only allowed strikers to monitor who was working for
the struck employer.'" As to picketing for the purpose of discour-
aging replacements from working, Huddleston took this dim view:
Now on this rests the great question of picketing. No
doubt the men are in the habit of taking an erroneous
view of what they may be permitted to do in the shape of
picketing, and it is a very serious question no doubt. They
have no right to watch or beset the house or other place
where a person resides, or works . . . for the purpose of
compelling any person to abstain from doing that which
he has a legal right to do.""
2. Persistently follows such other person about from place to place; or,
3. Hides any tools, clothes, or other properly owned or used by such other
person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use thereof; or,
4. Watches or besets the house or other place where such other person resides,
or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such
house or place; or
5. Follows such other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly
manner in or through any street or road. ..
Id.
I 35
 13 Cox Cr. Cas. 282, 285 (1876).
156 1d. at 282-83.
in Id. at 283.
' 38 Id.
138 See id. at 284. HuthIleston's rationale recognized the union's legitimate need to prevent
its members from fraudulently drawing striker benefit funds while at the same time working:
"Attending . . . means no doubt that occasionally you may „ find some who would, so to
speak, be 'traitors' to you who, while getting their share of the money raised for the support
of those on strike, go and work as well and thus get money from both sides." Id. at 291.
mBauld, 13 Cox Cr. Cas, at 284.
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Bauld's immediate effect was to reestablish the conspiracy paradigm
begun in Rowlands. More importantly, this line of decisions fed
directly into the conspiracy paradigm emerging in the United States.
Three state court decisions in the 1880s reflected the emerging
influence of the English conspiracy paradigm: State v. Stewart,"'
Crump v. Commonwealth 142 and State v. Glidden.'" A stonecutters'
union in State v. Stewart attempted to prevent an employer from
employing nonunion cutters, and was subsequently indicted for
conspiring "to prevent, hinder and deter by violence, threats and
intimidation, the Ryegate Granite-Works . . . from retaining and
taking into its employment James O'Rourke, William Goodfellow
and other persons" who were not unionists. 144 In ruling to uphold
the indictment, the court drew heavily from the Se151,y and Rowlands
line of authority:
The principle upon which the cases, English and Ameri-
can, proceed is that every man has the right to employ his
talents, industry, and capital as he pleases, free from the
dictation of others; and, if two or more combine to coerce
his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy. 145
It is critical to note that the indictment that was upheld by the court
was modeled after language appearing in the Act of 1825 and first
construed by the Rowlands court."8
Crump v. Commonwealth involved a union's effort to prevent a
Virginia printing company, Baughman Brothers, from employing
nonunion labor."' The Virginia court convicted W.F. Crump, acting
as an agent for the Richmond typographers' union, of conspiring
to use force, violence, threats or intimidation against Baughman
Brothers.' 48 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.I 49
' 41 9 A. 559 (Vt. 1887).
142 6 S.E. 620 (Va. 1888).
1" 8 A. 890 (Conn. 1888).
'++ 9 A. at 560.
1 45 /d. at 568.
116
 See id. at 569-70. The Stewart court directly acknowledged the link between Vermont's
conspiracy laws and the English conspiracy paradigm: "[The pleader has supplemented the
charge of unlawful conspiracy by an allegation of the means by which it is to be accomplished,
by violence, threats, and intimidation. Our statute . . . has prescribed a punishment for using
threats or intimidation to prevent a person from accepting or continuing an employment in
a mill." Id. at 569 (emphasis in original). In this passage, the court cited Rowlands and the
Act of 1825 expressly as authority. See id.
6 S.E. 620, 623 (Va. 1888).
" 13 Id.
14 ,
 Id. at 630.
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The union had followed the company's delivery wagon, obtained a
list of its customers and had "used every means, short of actual
force to compel them to cease dealing with Baughman Brothers." 15°
Although they did not strike Baughman Brothers, the union sought
to prevent the company from employing nonunion labor by pub-
lishing pamphlets stating: "Watch out for Baughman Brothers' `rats,'
and find out where they board. It is dangerous for honest men to
board in the same house with these creatures." 15 '
Citing Rowlands, the Crump court declared: "Every attempt, by
force, threat, or intimidation, to deter or control an employer in
the determination of whom he will employ . . . is an act of wrong
and oppression. . . . "I52 The court distinguished this case from Hunt
by reasoning that Hunt involved "a club or combination of journey-
men bootmakers simply to better their own condition, and it had
no aim or means of aggression upon the business or rights of
others."'" This case differed, however, because here the union used
force, defined in terms of "coercion by fear, threat, or intimation
of loss."'" It is noteworthy that Crump's common law standard was
similar to the "violence, threat, and intimidation" model in the
Parliament's Act of 1825.' 55
In the 1886 case of State v. Glidden, a New Haven typographers'
union demanded that a local newspaper sign a labor agreement
under threat of an organized boycott.' 56 Due to the threatened
boycott, the state of Connecticut indicted the typographers under
the state's conspiracy law.'" Applying the 1878 Act to the union's
conduct, the court concluded:
LiG Id.
15 ' Id.
' 52 6 S.E. at 628.
151 /d. at 629.
' 54 Id.
' 55 Act to Repeal the Laws Relating to the Combination of Workmen, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 129,
§ 3 (1825) (Eng.).
155 8 A. 890, 893 (Conn. 1887).
157
 The Connecticut statute provided that
every person who shall threaten or use any means to intimidate any person, to
compel such person, against his will, to do or abstain from doing any act which
such person has a legal right to do, or shall persistently follow such person in
a disorderly manner, or injure or threaten to injure his property, with intent to
intimidate him, shall . be liable.. ..
1878 Conn. Pub. Acts 92. This legislation was enacted only four years after Parliament
similarly prohibited "compel[ling] any other person to abstain from doing ... any act which
such person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing"; and "us[ing] violence to .. .
intimidate [any] other person or his wife or children, or . injudingi property; or . .
persistently follow[ing) other such person about from place to place; ... or follow[ing] such
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They propose to threaten and use means (the boycott) to
intimidate the Carrington Publishing Company to compel
it, against its will, to abstain from doing an act (to keep in
its employ the workmen of its own choice) which it had a
legal right to do, and to do an act (employ the defendants,
and such persons as they should name) which it had a
legal right to abstain from doing. There can be but one
answer to the question. The acts proposed are clearly
prohibited by the statute.' 58
During the 1870s and 1880s, there was a strong revival of trade
unionism. The striker replacement issue was important in the pe-
riod, as indicated by this early U.S. Department of Labor report:
Strikes against the numerous wage reductions which were
introduced in 1873 were particularly prevalent among
shoe workers, cigar makers, and textile and iron workers.
The numerous strikes of textile workers in Fall River
against periodic wage cuts were uniformly unsuccessful.' 59
These strikes failed because employers hired French-Canadian im-
migrants to fill vacancies and because strikers signed agreements
under force not to join any labor organization as the condition of
reemployment. ' 60
In the 1880s and 1890s, strike activity rose very sharply. 161
Moreover, strikes became increasingly violent. The year 1877, for
example, was remembered as the year of the great railroad strikes,
because these were marked by extreme violence. For the first time
in the United States, federal troops were called during peacetime
to suppress strikers.' 62
During this period, the conspiracy paradigm widened as courts
extended their power to restrict a range of union activities. Increas-
ingly, the issue in legal controversies involving striker replacements
was the legitimacy of court action in blocking the concerted activities
other person with two or more other persons in a disorderly manner...." Conspiracy and
Protection Act, 1875, 38 Sc 39 Vict., ch. 86, 3 (1875) (Eng.).
158 8 A. at 891-92.
159
 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BULL. No. 651, STRIKES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1880-1936, at 19 (1938).
180 Id.
' 6 ' Id. at 21. The number of strikes in the United States was fairly constant between 1881
and 1884 (477 in 1881; 476 in 1882; 506 in 1883; and 485 in 1884). Thereafter, strike
activity soared (695 in 1885; 1,572 in 1886; 1,503 in 1887; 946 in 1888; 1,111 in 1889; 1,897
in 1890; 1,786 in 1891; 1,359 in 1892; 1,375 in 1893; 1,404 in 1894; 1,255 in 1895; 1,066
in 1896; 1,110 in 1897; 1,098 in 1898; and 1,838 in 1899). Id.
' 62
 Id. at 19.
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of strikers. Also during this period, the direct linkage between
English and American decisions with respect to striker replacement
issues weakened. English and American courts, however, did take
a consistently hostile view of strikes and striker conduct aimed at
excluding replacements from taking union jobs.
Four major American and English decisions illustrate this con-
gruent treatment: In re Debs, 163 J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins,'" Taff
Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants" i 5 and
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trade Council.' 66 In the
1895 case of In re Delis, the United States Supreme Court validated
government suppression of a strike by issuance of injunctions and
imprisonment of strike leaders. 167 In May 1894, the American Rail-
way Union struck Pullman Palace Car Co.' 68 To make its strike
more effective, the union widened the strike to twenty-two railroad
companies.' 69 The union induced many of the railway employees
to leave their jobs and prevented the companies from hiring re-
placements. 17° The strike had an immense effect on the nation's
grain and livestock trade, transport of freight and mail, and pas-
senger service.' 7 ' As a consequence, four union officers, including
Eugene V. Debs, were enjoined by a federal court in July from
issuing orders and taking measures to effectuate the general strike
further.' 72 Upon the officers' failure to comply with the injunction,
1 " 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
1 " [1896] 1 Ch. 811.
155 1901 App. Cas. 426 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
165 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
167 158 U.S. at 599-600.
168 id. at 566.
10 Id. at 566-67. A comprehensive account of the Pullman strike appears in U.S. STRIKE
COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OE JUNE-JULY, 1894 (1895) thereinafter STRIKE
COMM'N REPORT].
17" 158 U.S. at 567. The complaint against the union also averred that union officers
"proceeded by collecting together in large numbers, by threats, intimidation, force and
violence at the station grounds, yards and right of way of said railroad companies . . to
prevent said companies from employing other persons to fill the vacancies aforesaid; to
compel others still employees . . . to quit such employment. .. ." Id. at 568. The U.S. Strike
Commission paintecha more vivid picture of this situation when it wrote:
The strike occurred on May 11, and from that time until the soldiers went to
Pullman, about July 4, three hundred strikers were placed about the company's
property, professedly to guard it from destruction or interference. This guard-
ing of property in strikes is, as a rule, a mere pretense. Too often the real object
of guards is to prevent newcomers from taking strikers' places, by persuasion,
often to he followed, if' ineffectual, by intimidation and violence.
STRIKE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 169, at xxxviii.
171 In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 569-70.
172 1d. at 570. A contemporaneous account by a writer sympathetic to organized labor
conveys the sweeping and unusual nature of the injunction:
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the four were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to three to
six months in jail.'" The Supreme Court ultimately denied Debs'
habeas corpus petition, holding that the government had lawful
authority to interfere with obstructions of interstate commerce, and
that the federal district court had equity jurisdiction to issue an
injunction in this rnatter. 174
As in Debs, English courts also made use of injunctions to end
strikes. J. Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins is notable because the court spe-
cifically enjoined a union's efforts to discourage replacements from
working through a strike.'" Like American courts issuing labor
injunctions in the same period, the Lyons court issued a restraining
order against the union, prohibiting it from "maliciously inducing,
or conspiring to induce, persons not to enter into the employment
of [Lyons)." 76
 The conspiracy paradigm was strongly reinforced in
On the seventh day of the strike, the Federal Military power was supreme in
Chicago, and in Illinois, and in all of the States where the boycott had been
applied. The situation was one of gravity, riot unlike that of martial law. The
regular army took control of things despite the urgent remonstrances of State
authorities. The Federal Judges, Wood and Grosscup, issued in Chicago the
most sweeping injunction ever issued by a Federal Court in a time of peace,
one which the first named of these men described as a 'Gatling Gun on paper.'
It absolutely enjoined the officers of the American Railway Union ... from the
further prosecution of the boycott, and even from 'persuading' any person to
take part in it. . . . It was a veritable drag-net, and was designed to terminate
at once and by force the application of that peaceful, proper, and lawful agency,
the boycott. . . Under the interpretation given to it by the Federal District
Attorney, thousands of boycotters might be seized every day by deputy marshals
empowered to make arbitrary arrests, arraigned before the bar, and summarily
punished for contempt of court.
JOHN SWINTON, STRIKING FOR LIFE 92-93 (1894).
173 In re Debs, 158 U.S. at 572-73.
174 Id. at 599-600.
[ 1896]1 Ch. 811,835-36. The Lyons court granted an interlocutory injunction against
officers of the Amalgamated Trade Society of Fancy Leather Workers, who were engaged
in a strike against a manufacturer of portmanteaus and leather bags. Id. at 81 I, 836. During
the strike, the union's executive committee picketed the workplace with signs reading:
Dear Sir—
You are hereby requested to abstain from taking work from Messrs. J. Lyons
& Sons, Redcross Street, E.C., pending a dispute. Members are also requested
to use their influence to keep non-society men, stitchers and machinists, &c.,
from applying for work until the dispute is settled.
Id. at 812. The record shows that the "pickets accosted persons entering and leaving the
plaintiffs' premises, tried to persuade them not to work for the plaintiffs, and gave them
some cards." Id.
16 Id. at 818. The court adopted the reasoning of Lord Esher, who, in Temperton v.
Russell, [1893) I Q.B. 715, viewed the efforts of a union to induce workers to quit while still
under contract as malicious "[i]f the persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of injuring
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the famous English case of Taff Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated
Society of Railway Servants, which was factually similar to the Pullman
strike in Debs.' 77
The Clayton Act, passed in 1914, seemingly weakened the con-
spiracy paradigm in America.' 78 The Act amended the antitrust
laws to allow federal courts to enjoin parties from conduct that will
cause loss, " 9 Congress, however, exempts labor organizations from
the Clayton Act in carrying out "legitimate objects."'" The Clayton
Act therefore appeared to prevent courts from applying antitrust
theories to enjoin strikes."'
In the 1921 case of Duplex v. Deering, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the legislative intent behind the labor exemp-
tion was unclear.' 82 The Court held:
As to § 6, it seems to us its principal importance . . . is for
what it does not authorize. . . . The section assumes the
the [employer], or of benefitting the [union] at the expense of the [employer]." Lyons, 1 Ch.
at 815 (quoting Teroperton, I Q.B. at 728).
In sustaining the injunction, the Lyons court concluded that "Parliament has not yet
conferred upon trade unions the power to coerce people, and to prevent them from working
for whomsoever they like. . . ." 1 Ch. at 822. The court clearly understood the implications
of enjoining strikers against persuading replacements not to work when it noted: "Some
strikes are perfectly effective by virtue of the mere strike, and other strikes are not effective
unless the next step can be taken, and unless other people can be prevented from taking the
place of the strikers." Id. The decision continued:
That is the pinch of the case in trade disputes; and until Parliament confers on
trade unions the power of saying to other people, "You shall not work for those
who are desirous of employing you upon such terms as you and they may
mutually agree upon," trade unions exceed their power when they try to compel
people not to work except on the terms fixed by the unions.
Id. at 823.
'77
	
App. Cas. 426 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.). This decision by the Privy Council
held that a union was suable and liable for damages resulting from illegal strike conduct. Id.
at 445.
178 Anti-Trust (Clayton) Act, ch. 323, 38 , Stat. 731 (1914) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
IN Clayton Act 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988).
180 1d. § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17.
10, Id. The Act provided:
[T]he labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor . .. organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual
help ... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
In 254 U.S. 443, 469 (1921).
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normal objects of a labor organization to be legitimate,
and declares that nothing in the anti-trust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of such
organizations or to forbid their members from lawfully
carrying out their legitimate objects; and that such an or-
ganization shall not be held in itself—merely because of
its existence and operation—to be an illegal combination
or conspiracy in restraint of trade.' 83
The chief consequence of this construction was to permit courts to
continue enjoining the concerted activities of unions, including
strikes and prevention of replacements from working.
In the same year that the Court decided Duplex, it also decided
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trade Council, a prototyp-
ical case of strikers preventing replacements from taking their
work.' 84 In that case, a federation of trade unions called a strike
against a large foundry after the employer had laid off 1,600 un-
ionized workers and reopened by hiring a mix of 300 nonunion
and union-affiliated workers. 183 All but two men showed up for
work after the Council posted its strike notice, so the Council estab-
lished pickets along the streets and at the rail depot leading to the
factory to effectuate the strike and deter replacements from work-
ing.' 86
 These pickets were confrontational and occasionally vio-
lent. 187
 As a result, the federal district court enjoined the Council
'" Id.
'" 257 U.S. 189 (1921).
'" Id. at 195-96. After declaring the strike, the Council displayed a notice announcing
the strike at the plant and called on all laborers to stay away from the plant so that workers
might win a wage increase. Id. at 196.
186
 Id. at 195-96.
"7 See id. at 197-98. The Court recounted the intensity and disorder occasioned by the
strike:
Complainant's employees testified that, just as the picketing began, they were
warned by some of the defendants that they would be hurt if they did not quit.
The master mechanic of the plant, Hall, testified that Lamb, one of the defen-
dants, the national representative of the Machinist's Union at St. Louis, .. .
handed him the circular of the Trades Council, and told him, "We don't like
the way you have treated our boys down here, and we just came down to raise
a little hell."
There was an assault on April 30th, in which one Hafner, an employee, was
attacked by three of the picketers.... On May 13th, another assault occurred,
which developed into a mob, and two witnesses for complainant swore positively
that the President of the Trades Council, Galloway, was engaged in this distur-
bance and was throwing bricks.
Id. at 197.
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from conspiring to prevent the employer from hiring striker re-
placements.' 88
At issue was whether the Clayton Act, which sharply curtailed
federal court jurisdiction to issue injunctions in matters arising out
of employment disputes, applied to the district court's order re-
straining individual picketers as well as the Council: 8" The Court
concluded that the injunction was applied properly to this dispute
because picket conduct was not peaceful or lawful.'" The employer
argued that because the Clayton Act did not expressly immunize
unions or union councils from injunctions, the Council was fully
subject to the district court's injunction power.'•" This meant, ar-
gued the employer, that the district court could enjoin not only
unlawful conduct, but also the Council's peaceful efforts to per-
suade replacements from working. The Court concluded, however,
that nothing "requires us to hold that the members of a local labor
union and the union itself do not have sufficient interest in the
wages paid to the employees of any employer in the community to
justify their use of lawful and peaceable persuasion to induce those
employees to refuse to accept such reduced wages and to quit their
employment."2 The Court thus ruled that "the restraint from
368 American Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 193. The Council argued that the court order
was overbroad in prohibiting strikers from picketing and persuading strike breakers to picket.
See id. at 195.
189 Id. at 201. The Clayton Act set forth jurisdictional limits on courts adjudicating labor
disputes:
[Mc) restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States . . . in any case between an employer and employees . . . or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out
of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property . . for which injury there is no
adequate remedy at law.. .
Clayton Act ch. 323,38 Stat. 731, § 20 (1914).
' 90 American Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 203-04. The Court noted that "[Ut is clear that
Congress wished to forbid the use of federal courts of their equity arm to prevent peaceable
persuasion by employees ... in promotion of their side of the dispute and to secure them
against judicial restraint in obtaining or communicating information. . . ." Id. at 203. But
where "those of the labor side adopt methods which however lawful in their announced
purpose inevitably lead to intimidation and obstruction, then it is the court's duty which the
terms of § 20 do not modify, so to limit what the propagandists do as to time, manner, and
place. . . ." Id. at 203-04. In this case, the injunction was proper because "three or four
groups of picketers were made up of from four to twelve in a group. . . . They began early
and continued . . . during the three weeks of the strike after the picketing began. All
information tendered, all arguments advanced and all persuasion used under such circum-
stances were intimidation." Id. at 204-05.
19 ' Id. at 208-09.
192 Id, at 212.
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persuasion included within the injunction of the District Court was
improper, and in that regard the decree must be fulfilled."'"
The conspiracy paradigm focused on the coordinated activities
of workers. If an activity intruded upon a general principle such as
free market competition or freedom of contract, it was found to be
an unlawful conspiracy. Although English courts generally recog-
nized the right to strike, there was debate as to whether striking
workers could prevent replacements from working for a struck
employer. The English cases, which took a very restrictive view of
striker conduct toward replacements, had a profound effect on the
conspiracy paradigm in the United States. Increasingly, American
courts used their power to enjoin potentially violent or unlawful
union activity directed at preventing employers' use of striker re-
placements.
C. The Paradigm of Concert
The American paradigm of concert was established with the
enactment of the NLRA in 1935. Section 7 of the Act embodies the
essence of concert in recognizing three core rights: the right of
workers to organize, to bargain collectively and to act in concert for
their mutual aid or benefit. 194 "Concert" has two meanings: the
right of workers to act collectively in their economic interest, and a
relationship of mutual engagement between workers and employers
resulting in a written contract covering pay and working condi-
tions.'95
The NLRA has two broad public policy aims: creation of eco-
nomic demand by increasing the purchasing power of workers and
legitimation of workers' economic and political rights. 196 Regretta-
bly, the Act does not explicitly address an employer's right to hire
permanent striker replacements. Section 13 of the NLRA provides
that the Act shall not be construed so as to diminish the right to
strike. 197 On the surface, this suggests that employers cannot hire
193
 Id. at 213.
193
 NLRA, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, § 7 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1988)). Section 157 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining.. .." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
193 For a discussion of the legislative history of the NLRA, see supra notes 6-11 and
accompanying text.
' 96 29 U.S.C. § 15 1 (1988). For a discussion of the public policy rationale of the NLRA,
see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
197
 NLRA, ch. 372 Stat. 449, § 13 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1988)).
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permanent replacements, because this practice clearly diminishes
the right to strike. On closer inspection, however, nothing in the
statute or its legislative history repealed common law rulings that
had the effect of permitting employers to hire permanent replace-
ments.
The statute's ambiguous treatment of the right to hire striker
replacements was further confused by the Supreme Court's con-
struction of that right in the 1938 case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co.'°8 and, more recently, in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 19° Pattern
Makers League v. NLRB 20° and TWA v. Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants.20 ' In Mackay Radio, a union of telegraphers struck their
employer after negotiations failed to produce a new labor agree-
ment. The employer hired replacements to work through the
strike.202
 Realizing that its strike had failed, the union agreed to
return to work three days later. 203 The employer, however, stated
that it would not displace eleven men who had filled in as replace-
ment workers during the short strike. 204
 A supervisor of the em-
ployer hence offered to reinstate all but eleven of the returning
strikers. 20' The employer required these eleven strikers to reapply
for their positions, indicating they would be reinstated as positions
opened. 200
 In the end, the employer denied reinstatement only to
five strikers who just happened to be the most active union mem-
bers. 2°7
The Court affirmed the National Labor Relations Board's find-
ing that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by not
reinstating the five strikers: "The Board found, and we cannot say
that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking back six of the eleven
men and excluding five who were active union men, the (company's]
officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union
activities. . . ."2°8 The Mackay Radio Court thus affirmed the concert
paradigm when it determined that employers cannot delay rein-
198 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
199 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
200 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
"1 489 U.S. 426 (1989).
202 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 337.
205 Id,
"4 Id. at 338.
"8 Id.
206 1d,
207 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 339.
208 Id at 347.
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statement of returning strikers if their motive is to punish such
workers for their strike activity.
The Mackay Radio Court did not, however, confine its analysis
to the issues presented in the litigation. In dictum the Court ruled
on the issue whether an employer may legally hire permanent stri-
ker replacements. 209
 Notably, the union did not challenge this prac-
tice, focusing instead on only the employer's discrimination against
five union activists."' Furthermore, although the Board found that
the employer effectively discharged these activists, it did not address
the issue of permanent replacements. 2 " But in dictum that further
confused the concert paradigm, the Court stated that it was not "an
unfair labor practice to replace striking employees with others in
an effort to carry on the business." 212 In a key passage, the Court
failed to give effect to § 13 of the NLRA, which provided that
Iniothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike." 21 s Although it
cited this section, the Court concluded that "it does not follow that
an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers." 214
The Court then expressly stated a principle permitting em-
ployers to hire permanent replacement workers, while failing to cite
any statutory or common law support for the proposition. In so
doing, the Court observed that an employer
209 See id. at 345-46.
210 See id. at 342-43.
2" See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 339. The Court, in restating the complaints initially
filed against the company, noted that the company was alleged to have "discharged ... the
five men who had not been reinstated to their positions for the reason that they had joined
and assisted the labor organization" and thus the company's conduct "was a discrimination
in respect of their hire and tenure of employment. . ." Id. at 339. Thus, the gravamen of
the complaint was employment discrimination motivated by anti-union animus (based spe-
cifically on § 8(3) of the NLRA), and not the employer's general practice of hiring permanent
replacement workers during a strike. See id.
212 Id, at 345.
212
	 (quoting NLRA, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449, § 13 (1935)). What is remarkable about the
Court's glossing over § 13 is that the practice of hiring permanent replacement workers can
have a very chilling effect on a worker's right to strike. To a striking worker who is placed
on a reinstatement list following the strike and who is not permitted to return to work until
his replacement leaves (the result of the permanent replacement rule in Mackay Radio), there
is no real protection under the Act. The permanent replacement rule leaves a returning
striker an employee without work indefinitely. Thus, innumerable workers may forego their
"protected" right to strike.
314 Id.
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is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them. The as-
surance by [the company] to those who accepted employ-
ment during the strike that if they so desired their places
might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor
was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as
there were vacant places to be filled. 2 ' 3
The NLRB subsequently tempered the Mackay Radio doctrine
by distinguishing economic strikers and unfair labor practice stri-
kers, and denying employers the right to hire permanent replace-
ments for the latter group. 216 This policy followed NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., in which the Supreme Court moderated its Mackay Radio
doctrine by providing that strikers are entitled to reinstatement
when their jobs become available (such as, for example, by expan-
sion of the employer's workforce). 217
In Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 400 warehouse and maintenance work-
ers at a building materials company struck their employer. 218 Bel-
knap granted a unilateral wage increase to any union worker who
remained on the job and also placed ads seeking permanent re-
placements. 219 It hired a large number of these applicants, while at
the same time the union filed a complaint alleging that Belknap's
unilateral pay increase was an unfair labor practice. 22° The Board's
regional director issued a complaint and, in an effort to prod Bel-
knap to settle the strike, stated that he would withdraw charges if
a strike settlement were reached. 22 ' The union and the company
then negotiated a strike settlement that provided in part for a
phased-in return of striking workers, who would displace the per-
manent replacements. 222 Twelve of the permanent replacements
who were discharged as a result of the strike settlement sued Bel-
knap under Kentucky law, alleging breach of contract and misre-
presentation. 223 They sought $250,000 in compensatory damages
and an equal amount in punitive damages. 224
213 Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.
216 See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375,379 n.5 (1967).
211 Id. at 381.
218 463 U.S. 491,493 (1983).
V9 Id.
r" Id. at 494-95.
22 ' Id. at 495-96,
222 Id. at 496.
223 Belknap, 463 U.S. at 496-97.
224 Id. at 497.
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In Belknap, the Supreme Court affirmed the Kentucky Court
of Appeals' holding that replacement workers' misrepresentation
and breach of contract claims were not preempted by the NLRA. 225
Belknap argued that the replacement workers' claims were
preempted on two grounds. First, the workers' state claims involved
conduct that is protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 226 Second,
the state claims were related to conduct that Congress purposely
left unregulated. 227
 The latter argument was based on the theory
that when Congress enacted the NLRA it intended self-help to be
available to the parties in labor-management conflicts without state
interference. 228
The Belknap majority dismissed the first argument, concluding
that it was merely an alternative way of stating that the employer is
not accountable for its assurances of permanent employment or for
any other misrepresentations in obtaining permanent replace-
ments.229
 The Court continued: "We do not think that the normal
contractual rights and other usual legal interests of the replacements
can be so easily disposed of by broad-brush assertions that no legal
rights may accrue to [the permanent replacements] during a strike
because the federal law has privileged the 'permanent' hiring of
replacements and encourages settlement." 2"
Concerning the second argument, Belknap argued that to allow
the case to continue would disturb "the delicate balance of forces
established by the federal law."23 ' The company further urged that
permitting these costly suits against employers for making agree-
ments for the return of striking workers would contravene federal
policy in favor of settling labor disputes. 232 The Court, however,
was unpersuaded by this argument and concluded that
when an employer attempts to exercise this very privilege
by promising the replacements that they will not be dis-
charged to make room for returning strikers, it surely
does not follow that the employer's otherwise valid prom-
ises of permanent employment are nullified by federal law
"5
 Id. at 512.
"6 Id. at 498 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
247
	 at 499 (citing Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132 (1976)).
249 Belknap, 463 U.S. at 499.
2" Id. at 501.
"0 Id.
23' Id. at 499.
254 Id.
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and its otherwise actionable misrepresentations may not
be pursued. 233
Addressing the issue of how employers would exercise their Mackay
Radio right to hire permanent replacements without incurring lia-
bility for breach of contract or misrepresentation in the event of a
strike settlement, the Court suggested that employers simply make
their offers of employment to replacement workers "conditional." 234
This approach, however, is simplistic. Employers would likely
attract fewer "conditional" permanent replacements (a contradic-
tion in terms) than permanent replacements. As a result of Belknap,
a struck employer is likely to work through a strike by offering
replacement workers genuine permanence, thereby avoiding Bel-
knap causes of action by not settling strikes, or by reaching settle-
ment agreements in which strikers do not displace their permanent
replacements. Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Belknap was sen-
sitive to this prospect:
The Court's conditional promise achieves only one thing:
it permits an employer, during settlement negotiations
with the union, to threaten to retain permanent employees
in preference to returning strikers despite the fact that
the employer has not promised to do so. The naked in-
terest in making such a threat, silently endorsed in the
Court's opinion, could not be less legitimate under the
NLRA. From the employer's point of view, one benefit of
offering strike replacements permanent employment is
that strikers become fearful that they will lose their jobs.
But it is clear that creating this fear, which discourages
union membership and concerted activities, is a deleteri-
ous side-effect of, rather than a legitimate business justi-
fication for, the power to hire permanent strike replace-
ments.235
Justice Brennan's dissent in Belknap clearly illustrated how the
Court's holding undermines settled labor law by hypothesizing a
fairly common scenario where an employer commits an unfair labor
practice at the time it hires permanent striker replacements. 236 Be-
25 Belknap, 463 U.S at 500.
2M See id. at 501-02.
2" Id. at 516 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
254 See id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "Rjhe strike involved
in this case ... arguably was converted into an unfair labor practice strike almost immediately
after it started, if the strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike, the striking
employees were entitled to reinstatement irrespective of [Belknap's] decision to hire per-
manent replacements." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cause strikers who are victims of unfair labor practices cannot be
displaced by permanent replacements, the Board would be required
by law to reinstate the strikers at the conclusion of their work
stoppage. 237 In this situation, therefore, an employer would be sub-
ject to directly conflicting federal law (requiring reinstatement of
ULP strikers) and state law (creating liability for an employer's
dismissal of permanent replacements). 238 The only way for an em-
ployer to avoid this conflict would be to retain redundant sets of
employees, surely an economic burden. The dissent concluded:
"This sort of conflicting regulation is intolerable," 239 Moreover, it
found that the majority decision weakened the concert paradigm
when it stated that the "Court's change in the law of permanency
weakens the rights of strikers and undermines the protections af-
forded those rights by the Act.'' 240
In the 1985 Supreme Court case of Pattern Makers League v.
NLRB, a union conducted an economic strike against an employer
association for several months. 24 ' When its membership voted to
reject a proposed contract settlement, eleven members tendered
their resignations from the union and returned to work. 242 Union
bylaws, however, prohibited members from resigning during a
strike. 243 Consequently, the union fined these crossovers (union
members who return to work) an amount equal to their wages for
the period they crossed the union's picket line. 244 The employer
association, not the crossovers, filed a charge with the Board that
the union's fines violated the crossovers' rights under § 8(b)(1)(A)
of the NLRA. 245 The Board upheld these charges, and the Court's
decision in Pattern Makers League affirmed the Seventh Circuit's
enforcement of the Board's ruling. 246
2" See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority observed that "had the strike been
adjudicated an unfair labor practice strike Belknap would have been required to reinstate
the strikers... ." 463 U.S. at 511.
"' See Belknap, 463 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
440 Id. at 540 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
241 473 U.S. 95, 97 (1984).
442 Id. at 95.
"3 /d. at 96.
244 Id. at 98.
245
	
Section 8(b)(1)(A) states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization . . . to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section (7). . ." Importantly, the section continues: "Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition or retention of membership therein.. .." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988).
246 Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 100.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Powell reasoned that
§ 8(b)(1)(A)'s prohibition against union restraint or coercion is
purely an extension of § 7's guarantee of an employee's right to
refrain from union activities:
When employee members of a union refuse to support a
strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work
during a strike), they are refraining from 'concerted ac-
tivity.' Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for
returning to work 'restrain[s]' the exercise of their section
7 rights. 247
The Court sweepingly concluded that "fining employees to enforce
compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act. "248
It based its reasoning partly on Taft-Hartley's amendment of § 7,
creating an employee right to refrain from union membership, 249
and also on an amendment outlawing closed shops in favor of
voluntary unionism. 2" This decision weakens the concert paradigm
by denying unions the power to deter their own members from
breaking ranks during a strike.
The dissent in Pattern Makers League reasoned that § 8(b)( 1)(A)
expressly allowed limited union discipline of its members, yet the
majority's ruling proscribed all discipline, "no matter how limited
and no matter how reasonable." 25 ' In dissent, Justice Blackmun
premised his reasoning on the centrality of union discipline to
effective collective bargaining: "Unless internal rules can be en-
forced, the union's status as bargaining representative will be
eroded, and the rights of members to act collectively will be jeop-
ardized."252
 This reasoning acknowledges that a union's use of its
247 1d. at 101.
242
 Id. (emphasis added). The broad scope of this conclusion is emphasized because the
majority opinion appeared to give little or no effect to § 8(b)(1)(A)'s exemption of internal
union discipline.
249
	 id. at 102-03. Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all (concerted] activities...." NLRA 7,29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
The majority reasoned that at the time Taft-Hartley was enacted "union constitutional
provisions restricting the right to resign were uncommon, if not unknown. Therefore,
allowing unions to 'extend an employee's membership obligation through restrictions on
resignations' would 'expan[d] the definition of internal action beyond the contours envisioned
by the 'raft-Hartley Congress." See Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 103. In short, the
majority reasoned that any restriction on employee resignation from unions was an unlawful
end-run around the § 7 provision for employee freedom from union affiliation and activity.
2" Id. at 106.
251
 Id. at 117-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 118 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ultimate economic weapon, the strike, necessarily imposes a high,
short-term cost on members that the union hopes will be recouped
in the long term. In such a situation, high-minded notions of group
solidarity are likely to be undercut by the real and immediate need
felt by individuals to return to work: 2"
Union activity, by its very nature, is group activity, and is
grounded on the notion that strength can be garnered
from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment. This con-
cept is of particular force during a strike, where the in-
dividual members of the union draw strength from the
commitments of fellow members, and where the activities
carried on by the union rest fundamentally on the mutual
reliance that inheres in the 'pact' (citation omitted). 254
The dissent attacked the majority's failure to take into account
the legislative history behind § 8(b)( 1)(A), in which the Taft-Hartley
Congress expressly distinguished permissible and impermissible
forms of union discipline of members. It noted that Congress
openly dismissed the Court's interpretation of sections 7 and
8(b)(1)(A). 255 Specifically, "[t]he House regarded the 'right to re-
frain' of section 7(a) as the right not to join in union activity, making
it illegal for 'representatives and their partisans and adherents to
harass or abuse employees into joining labor organizations.'" 256 Fur-
thermore, observed the dissent, "[t]here is no suggestion that the
House considered the right to refrain to include the right to aban-
don an agreed-upon undertaking at will. . . ." 257 In analyzing the
Pattern Makers' restriction against member resignation, the dissent
also noted: "The rule stands for the proposition that to become a
union member one must be willing to incur a certain obligation
upon which others may rely. . . . "258
2" See Michael H. LeRoy, Striker Replacements and Strike Crossovers: An Empirical Public
Policy Analysis of the NLRB's No-Presumption Policy, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 320-24 (1991)
(unionized workers who are most likely to cross their union's picket line during a strike are
likely to do so for economic reasons, not because they are unhappy with union representa-
tion).
254 Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 118-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB
v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213, 221 (1972)).
255 Id. at 121 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
656 Id. at 122 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
30 (1947)).
2" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
258 Pattern Makers League, 473 U.S. at 120-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Importantly, the
dissent noted that the bylaws did not operate in the coercive fashion of the abolished closed
shop: "An employee who violates the rule does not risk losing his job, and the union cannot
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In TWA v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, a union of
flight attendants went on strike two years after their contract had
expired and negotiations failed to produce an agreement. 259 The
airline stated its intention to work through the strike by hiring
permanent replacements for striking attendants.m Recognizing the
possibility that it could not hire a sufficient number of permanent
replacement workers immediately, the airline determined that it
would have to induce striking flight attendants to abandon their
strike and return to work. 26 ' It offered crossovers their choice of
domiciles and flights left open by strikers and promised to preserve
these choices by denying strikers their former domiciles and routes
at the conclusion of the strike. 262
TWA's strategy thus added a new wrinkle to the practice of
hiring permanent striker replacements by inducing striking workers
to join the ranks of the replacements. The airline created a zero-
sum exchange among workers in which those who exercised their
right not to strike gained at the expense of those who did. This
resulted in "offensive" crossing over by junior strikers who sought
an immediate and permanent reward for abandoning the strike and
"defensive" crossing over by senior strikers who sought to protect
the domiciles and routes they acquired only by accumulating sub-
stantial seniority. 26'
seek an employer's coercive assistance in collecting any fine that is imposed." Id. at 121
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun further observed: "The rule neither coerces a
worker to become a union member against his will, nor affects an employee's status as an
employee under the Act." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded: "Thus, [the
rule] clearly falls within the power of any voluntary association to enact and enforce the
requirements and standards of membership itself,' so as to permit the association effectively
to pursue collective goals." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting 93 Corm. Rec. 4433 (1947)
(remarks of Sen. Ball)).
259 489 U.S. 426, 428-29 (1989).
259 Id. at 429-30.
261 Id. at 430. The strike lasted 72 days, and during this time, TWA was able to hire only
2,350 permanent replacement workers. Id. at 430. In addition, 1,280 unionized flight atten-
dants either did not strike at all or abandoned the strike and returned to work during the
72 days. Id. At the end of the strike, 5,000 flight attendants still were not working. Id.
262 TWA, 489 U.S. at 430. The Court noted: "Thus, at the conclusion of the strike, senior
full-term strikers would not be permitted to displace permanent replacements or junior
nonstriking flight attendants and could be left without an opportunity to return to work."
Id.
acs
	 id. at 429-30. The Court summarized the effect of TWA's crossover strategy:
TWA's promise not to displace working flight attendants after the strike created
two incentives specifically linked to the seniority bidding system: it gave senior
Hight attendants an incentive to remain at, or return to, work in order to retain
their prior jobs and domicile assignments; it gave junior flight attendants an
incentive to remain at, or return to, work in order to obtain job and domicile
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The TWA Court held that the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") does
not require employers to replace junior crossovers with more senior
strikers once the strike is over. 264 The union, conceding that Mackay
Radio permitted TWA to hire permanent replacements, argued that
its circumstances were distinguishable: here, crossovers from the
bargaining unit were granted an employment preference by pen-
alizing continuing strikers. 265 Citing the 1963 Supreme Court case
of NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., the union argued that TWA could
not lawfully grant crossovers an employment preference that it did
not also grant to continuing strikers. 266 The Erie Resistor Court had
ruled that the granting of such an exclusive employment preference
to crossovers creates a long-term division in the company between
those loyal to the union and those who gained seniority by breaking
the strike. 267 Thus, "[t]his breach is re-emphasized with each sub-
sequent layoff and stands as an ever-present reminder of the dan-
gers connected with striking and with union activities in general." 268
An employer's granting of special treatment to crossovers therefore
weakens the concert paradigm by allowing employers to tamper
internally with union solidarity and by penalizing workers who ex-
ercise their right to strike. 269
assignments that were previously occupied by more senior, striking flight atten-
dants.
Id.
264 TWA, 489 U.S. at 432. The case arose under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), which
covers rail and air transport workers. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Construction of the RLA and
NLRA often is identical; the Court noted that "carefully drawn analogies from the federal
common labor law developed under the NLRA may be helpful in deciding cases under the
RLA." 489 U.S. at 432.
265 See id. at 434.
266 /d. (citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963)). In Erie Resistor, the
employer worked through the strike not only by hiring replacements, but also by granting
strikers twenty years of super-seniority if they abandoned the strike and crossed their picket
line. 373 U.S. at 230-31. Super-seniority is artificial seniority, commonly granted to local
union officers regardless of their actual seniority. Workers with super-seniority tend to be
immunized against the ordinary progression of layoffs, and also enjoy job-bidding advan-
tages.
267 Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 231.
268 Id.
269 See TWA, 489 U.S. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan remarked in
dissent:
More fundamental, I fear, is the legal mistake inherent in the Court's objection
to 'penalizing those who decided not to strike in order to benefit those who
did.' The Court, of course, does precisely the opposite: it allows TWA to single
out for penalty precisely those employees who were faithful to the strike until
the end, in order to benefit those who abandoned it. What is unarticulated is
the Court's basis for choosing one position over the other. If indeed one group
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The majority in TWA, however, characterized the penalty for
strikers merely as a lost "gamble." Recognizing that workers under
the RLA have a right to choose not to strike, the Court concluded
that in almost all strikes, some employees will object to their union's
decision to strike and that such employees cannot be compelled to
accept such a decision.27° Consequently, distinguishing crossovers
from new hires would effectively penalize employees who chose not
to strike to benefit employees who did strike. 2" The Court saw no
reason why employees who did not gamble on the strike should
have to suffer the results of an unsuccessful gamble. 272 TWA adds
to the ambiguous character of the concert paradigm by narrowly
construing a worker's right to strike. Although it leaves the right to
strike intact, it adds to the penalties associated with the exercise of
that right.
In sum, Mackay Radio, Belknap, Pattern Makers League, and TWA
sharply restrict the concert paradigm. These decisions have not,
however, broken the paradigm, because at no time has the paradigm
expressly shielded strikers from employer hiring of permanent re-
placements.
D. The Paradigm of Cartelization
However much Mackay Radio and its recent progeny of Su-
preme Court decisions have discouraged strikes, and consequently,
weakened the concert paradigm, these decisions have not broken the
paradigm. If Mackay Radio were paradigm-breaking, essentially the
same Democratic Congress and the same President who enacted the
NLRA three years earlier would likely have repealed it. In fact, the
decision created no ripple until the 1980s. Organized labor's adverse
reaction to Mackay Radio was delayed by fifty years, suggesting that
the striker replacement phenomenon is a symptom of more recent
problems impinging on a worker's right to strike.
The right to strike has been seriously undermined on several
fronts. The concentration of unionized workers in virtually all pri-
or the other is to be 'penalized' what basis does the Court have for determining
that it should be those who remained on strike rather than those who returned
to work? I see none, unless it is perhaps an unarticulated hostility toward strikes.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" 489 U.S. at 936-37.
271 Id. at 438,
272 Id,
302	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:257
vate sector industries dropped sharply in the 1980s. 275 Conse-
quently, many unions throughout the 1980s negotiated concessions,
largely to keep unionized employers competitive with lower-cost
nonunion employers. 274 Government deregulation of key and heav-
ily unionized industries such as trucking, 275 airlines276 and
telecommunications 277 weakened collective bargaining by implicitly
favoring nonunion firms and penalizing firms with comparatively
costly collective bargaining agreements. To survive, some unionized
firms had to confront unions aggressively. As a result, it is likely
that some firms invoked the permanent replacement strategy as a
heavy-handed bargaining tool.
The 1980s and 1990s also marked the globalization of much of
the free world's economy. For American labor, globalization meant
that heavily unionized industries such as autos, 278 stee127° and
textiles28° could be moved to countries with much cheaper labor.
275 See Chaison & Rose, supra note 4, at 15. Between 1980 and 1989, union density—the
proportion of the workers represented by unions—dropped in every sector of the economy
except government employment. In mining, density fell from 32.0% to 17.5% in the period;
in construction, from 30.9% to 21.5%; in manufacturing, from 32.3% to 21.6%; in trans-
portation, communications and utilities, from 48.4% to 31.6%; in wholesale and retail trade,
from 10.1% to 6.3%; in finance, from 3.2% to 2.3%; and in services, from 8.9% to 5.8%. Id.
See also Curme et al., supra note 50, at 9.
'" See Linda Bell, Explaining Union Concessions in the 1980s, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q.
REV. 44 (Summer 1989); David J. Walsh, Accounting for the Proliferation of Two-Tier Wage
Settlements in the U.S. Airline Industry, 1983-1986,42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 50 (1988); Peter
Cappelli, Plant-Level Concession Bargaining, 39 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 90 (1985); Audrey
Freedman & William E. Fulmer, Last Rites for Pattern Bargaining, HMO!. Bus. REV., Mar.–Apr.
1982, at 30.
275 For a general overview of trucking regulations, see Harold M. Levinson, Trucking, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 99 (Gerald G. Somers ed.,
1980).
276 For a general overview of airline deregulation, see Elizabeth E. Bailey et al., DERE-
GULATING THE AIRLINES 27-37 (1985).
277 For a general overview of telephone deregulation, see Barry G. Cole, Introduction, in
AFTER THE BREAKUP: ASSESSING THE NEW POST AT&T DIVESTITURE ERA I (Barry Cole ed.,
1991). Between 1968 and 1972, while AT&T was a regulated monopoly, 86% of all workers
in the telephone industry were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Richard B.
Freeman & James L. Medoff, New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States, 32
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 143, 150 (1978). However, after deregulation, industry unionization
rates plummeted to 64% in 1983-1985 and 49% in 1988. See Curme et al., supra note 50, at
17.
276 Between 1979 and 1984, approximately 225,000 auto manufacturing jobs were lost
in the U.S. See Paul 0. Flaim & Ellen Sehgal, Displaced Workers of 1979-1983: How Well Have
They Fared?, 108 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 ( June 1985).
"9 Between 1979 and 1984, approximately 220,000 jobs in primary metals (primarily
steel) were lost in the U.S. See Flaim & Sehgal, supra note 278, at 12-13.
"° Between 1979 and 1984, approximately 212,000 textile jobs were lost in the U.S. See
id. at 5.
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The right to strike was obviously blunted by increased job mobility.
In sum, it is likely that declining unionization, broader deregulation
and increased job mobility weakened the right to strike in conjunc-
tion with the Mackay Radio doctrine of permanent striker replace-
ments.
In organized labor's view, the Mackay Radio doctrine permitting
an employer to hire permanent striker replacements completely
undermines both workers' right to strike and the collective bargain-
ing process. 281 In the 1990s, the primary legislative goal of the AFL-
CIO has been passage of the Workplace Fairness Act, which would
make an employer's hiring of permanent striker replacements an
unfair labor practice. 282 Recognizing the importance of their right
to hire permanent striker replacements, employers have strenuously
argued against this bill. 283 In 1992, the Workplace Fairness Act
281 See Prohibiting Permanent Replacement of Striking Workers: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transp., House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 114 (1991) [hereinafter Aviation Hearing] (testimony of Vicki Frankovich, President,
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants). Ms. Frankovich stated:
Our courts have made a mockery of federal statutes regulating and promoting
collective bargaining. Congress has specifically protected the right to strike and
has specifically prohibited employee discrimination based upon the exercise of
that right. It is unlawful, Congress has said, for an employer to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because that employee has exercised
the right to strike. As illustrated by the IFFA-TWA post-strike litigation, the
federal courts have, under the guise of interpretation, effectively repealed these
statutes.
Id. (emphasis in the original). See also id. at 120 (testimony of George J. Kourpias, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers). Mr. Kourpias stated:
Mlle Mackay doctrine goes against the federal labor policy's most basic purpose.
It approves of a harsh injustice against working men and women when they
exercise their right to engage in concerted and protected union activity. This
doctrine does violence to healthy relations between management and labor, and
sickens the otherwise healthy concept of the collective bargaining relationship.
I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that the Mackay doctrine threatens
the very foundation of free collective bargaining.
Id.
282 See H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Weeks before the House vote on I-1.R. 5, the
Workplace Fairness Act, the AFL-CIO aired television and radio ads in 20 key states with
uncommitted legislators and provided more than 600 newspaper editors with fact-sheets
answering questions about the bill. Muriel H. Cooper, Union Members 'Fired Up' to Win Big on
H.R. 5, AFL-CIO NEWS, July 8, 1991, at 1, 3.
In appealing to senators to vote for the equivalent of H.R. 5, S. 55, AFL-CIO President
Lane Kirkland said the bill was "the most important labor law initiative to come before
Congress in more than a decade." Muriel H. Cooper, Labor Mobilizes for Final Push on S. 55,
AFL-CIO NEWS, Mar. 30, 1991, at 1.
2" Labor Hearing, supra note 64, at 138-39 (statement of Richard S. Hoyt). Mr. Hoyt
stated on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce:
My business, like many others, is labor-intensive and operates under severe time
constraints. If I cannot provide my customers with a product within budget and
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passed by vote of the House of Representatives but subsequently
died in the Senate. The bill awaits re-introduction in the new
congressional term, and organized labor is unlikely to abandon it.
The proposed bill would create two new unfair labor practices.
These ULPs would make it unlawful for an employer 1) to hire
permanent replacements for strikers and 2) to grant an employment
preference to someone working through a strike without offering
the same preference to continuing strikers. 284 These two provisions
are clearly aimed at repealing the permanent striker replacement
doctrine in Mackay Radio and the preferential-benefit-to-crossovers
holding in TWA.
If it had passed, this law would have been paradigm-breaking
because it would have given organized labor unprecedented control
over the supply of labor available to an employer during a strike.
This Article's analysis of statutes and common law decisions during
the combination, conspiracy and concert paradigms disclosed no
public policies that resulted in an express limitation on the quantity
or quality of replacements available to employers during a strike.
In contrast, this proposed law would exclude a large segment of an
employer's relevant labor market from competing with strikers for
on time, they will find a contractor who can. Disruptions caused by labor disputes
are costly and counterproductive in any industry, but especially in the construc-
tion industry, where work is performed sequentially. A work stoppage caused
by a labor protest at a critical stage of a multiemployer construction project can
bring the entire project to a standstill, affecting many other employers and their
employees. It is vital that contractors have the flexibility to complete a project,
where necessary, using permanent replacements for striking workers or sub-
contractors involved in a labor dispute. . . . Unfortunately, [the striker replace-
ment bill] will not only encourage labor disputes but also will severely restrict
an employer's ability to continue operations during those disputes.
Id.
2" See H.R. 5 Sc S. 55, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing to amend the National
Labor Relations Act by making it an unfair labor practice for employers "to offer, or to
grant, the status of permanent replacement employee to an individual performing bargaining
unit work for the employer during a labor dispute"). This provision would repeal the holding
of Mackay Radio. The second provision would repeal the holding of TWA by making it an
unfair labor practice:
[T]o otherwise offer, or grant, an individual any employment preference based
on the fact that such individual was employed, or indicated a willingness to be
employed, during a labor dispute over an individual who— (A) was an employee
of the employer at the commencement of the dispute; (B) has exercised the
right to join, to assist, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection through the labor
organization involved in the dispute; and (C) is working for, or has uncondi-
tionally offered to return to work for the employer.
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their vacated positions. In effect, the proposed law would put strik-
ing employees in the position of exercising cartel power vis-a-vis
their employer.
A cartel consists of an agreement by two or more producers to
" maximize their profits by agreeing to set the monopoly price and
to limit their output to the monopoly output. "285 Although this
definition pertains to sellers of products, it readily applies to work-
ers, sellers of labor. The law would cartelize strikers by treating
their collective bargaining position as a workers' agreement to max-
imize wages and working conditions by exercising monopoly power
over an employer's supply of labor. Employers would experience a
labor-cartelization effect because the only available workers would
be strikers—the very workers who agreed among themselves to
maximize wages and working conditions by withholding their labor.
How would the proposed law accomplish this? After all, in
theory employers would be free to hire from the same pool of
substitute labor as before, because the law would place no express
limitation on that labor pool. In practice, however, the legal pro-
hibition against hiring permanent striker replacements would sharply
limit the substitute labor pool.
The 1991-1992 Caterpillar strike provides a compelling illus-
tration. In that strike, tens of thousands of potential labor-substi-
tutes immediately answered employer ads to serve as striker replace-
ments. 288 Many expressed a willingness to move to distant cities for
the promise of a permanent position.287 Anecdotal accounts suggest
that a large number of replacements would have been employed
workers wishing to leave their jobs for substantially better wages
and benefits at Caterpillar. 288 Common sense suggests, however, that
many fewer of these substitutes would leave their present jobs, and
in some cases relocate, only for a temporary job at a struck employer.
A struck employer, then, would find its labor pool essentially re-
duced to unemployed people located nearby and strikers. Particu-
larly for employers who rely on a skilled workforce, the proposed
285 RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES,
AND OTHER MATERIALS 96 (1981). See also Richard Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, in
LABOR LAW AND THE EMPLOYMENT MARKET 44, 46 (Richard A. Epstein & Jeffrey Paul eds.,
1985) (proposing that much of labor law amounts to an effort to cartelize labor markets at
the expense of labor market efficiency); Morgan 0. Reynolds, The Myth of Labor's Inequality
of Bargaining Power, 12 J. LAB. RES. 167, 179 (1991) (arguing that protective labor laws are
"interventions to foster cartelization of labor markets"),
2" Dine, supra note 25, at 10A.
282 Id.
488 See For UAW, 'A Question of Survival,' supra note 20, at 1.
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law's restriction would virtually cut off the supply of qualified re-
placement workers: there would be no effective working through
strikes. 289
V. CONCLUSIONS
At no time have any of the current or past striker replacement
paradigms granted workers labor-cartelization powers during eco-
nomic strikes. Organized labor's view that Mackay Radio's doctrine
of permanent striker replacements is an aberration in national labor
policy is therefore unfounded. 29° The proposed law would establish
a desirable public policy because it would restore the balance of
power that existed between employers and workers before its ero-
sion in the 1980s and 1990s. This restoration of balanced bargaining
power between workers and employers is the proper rationale for
repealing Mackay Radio's doctrine of permanent striker replace-
ments. This Article demonstrates that there is no historical prece-
dent for repealing the Mackay Radio doctrine, and so such a repeal
would be paradigm-breaking. Paradoxically, the paradigm of con-
cert envisioned under the NLRA can no longer be achieved without
a public policy that is paradigm-breaking, because trade is much
more global, jobs are much more mobile and employer power to
frustrate union organization is much greater than it was in 1935.
The NLRA's policy prescription favoring equality of bargaining
power between workers and employers follows the American philo-
sophical tradition of balancing power between competing factions.
It was Madison, not Marx, who observed that
the most common and durable source of factions has been
the verious [sic] and unequal distribution of property.
Those who hold and those who are without property have
ever formed distinct interests in society. . . . A landed
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a
moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of
necessity in civilized nations, and divide themselves into
2" See Aviation Hearing, supra note 281, at 193-94 (statement of Professor David Westfall,
Harvard Law School). Professor Westfall stated:
Although some struck employers operate with supervisors and non-striking
employees and others manage with temporary replacements, it is difficult to
imagine others doing so successfully. Skilled employees are unlikely to be willing
to fill a striker's job without some assurance that they are not subject to
discharge whenever the striker offers to return.
Id.
290 See Labor Hearing, supra note 64, at 56 (statement of Owen Bieber, President, UAW).
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different classes, actuated by different sentiments and
views. The regulation of these various and interfering
interests forms the principal task of modern
legislation. . . . 291
By virtually all measures, including extremely low strike activity,
power in the American industrial relations system has tilted in favor
of employers. Whatever inconveniences and harm to the economy
resulted from earlier periods of increased strike activity, that activity
occurred within a system of regulated conflict. The danger in failing
to restore the balance of power between unions and employers is
that unions will wither away, employer power will grow unchecked,
and worker frustration will be left to combust outside the arena of
institutionalized conflict.
291 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (,James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
